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Abstract 
For my Capstone Project, I compared and contrasted indigenous 
movements in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru.  In my preliminary research of Latin 
American indigenous movements, I noted that Ecuador and Bolivia have had the 
most successful indigenous movements at the national level in the region while 
Peru’s indigenous groups have lagged behind the mobilization fervor.  Although 
Peru has a large indigenous population, even higher than the proportion of 
indigenous groups in Ecuador, its indigenous movement has not transpired passed 
the local level. 
To help explain this anomaly, I consulted several texts to compare theories 
about what made indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador successful 
nationally and about why Peru lacked an indigenous movement.  On the basis of 
the theories I researched as well as lessons learned from prior courses, I drew 
conclusions that I applied in my thesis. 
Most importantly, I found that Peru’s indigenous case is not a result of 
geographic hindrances or elite oppression since its geography and existent racist 
attitudes are similar to Ecuador and Bolivia.  Rather, the violence caused by 
Sendero Luminoso, the Peruvian military, and the Fujimori regime inhibited 
indigenous mobilization in Peru because its indígenas did not have the same 
resources available to indigenous peoples in Ecuador and Bolivia (such as funding 
from transnational actors).  Although indigenous movements in Ecuador and 
Bolivia are not identical, the comparisons between these two movements and 
Peru’s indigenous peoples highlight the hindrances of its indigenous mobilization. 
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Brigham 1 
Introduction 
 
 In 1990, indigenous peoples in Ecuador launched a national, political 
protest to demand equal rights in the Intí Raymi levantimiento, or “uprising.”  
Two years later, two thousand indigenous supporters affiliated with the 
Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) would 
march from Pastaza province to Quito to demand adjudication of land disputes 
and constitutional reform that would recognize indigenous land, social, and 
political rights as well as the plurinationality of Ecuador’s society (Sawyer, 1997: 
1).  Probably known to be the most successful indigenous movement in Latin 
America, the Ecuadorian indigenous movement would reach the peak of its power 
in January 2000 when Antonio Vargas Guatatuca, the president of CONAIE, and 
Carlos Solózano Constantini, a populist lawyer from Guayaquil, led the Junta of 
National Salvation’s successful effort to remove President Jamil Mahuad from 
power (Almeida Vinueza, 2005: 97). 
 Meanwhile, evolving from the Katarista Movement that emerged in the 
Aymara highlands of La Paz in the late 1960s, the Bolivian campesino movement 
would grow into a politicized, national indigenous movement during the 1990s.  
The Bolivian indigenous movement would achieve success comparable to 
Ecuador’s movement.  Rather than contributing to a coup as Ecuadorian groups 
had, however, the indigenous movement in Bolivia would help elect an 
indigenous person, Evo Morales, to the presidency for the first time in January 
2006 (Stiglitz, p. 1).  Recently, Morales pushed for a new bill of rights, with a 
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chapter dedicated to Bolivia’s 36 indigenous peoples, to be added to Bolivia’s 
constitution (Piette, p. 1).  It was ratified by Congress in February 2009 (New 
Bolivia Constitution in Force, p. 1). 
 The indigenous movement in Peru, however, has lagged far behind the 
indigenous movements of its two neighbors.  Although 38 to 40 percent of Peru’s 
population is indigenous (versus 60 to 70 percent of Bolivia’s population and only 
30 to 38 percent of Ecuador’s population), Peru’s indigenous peoples have barely 
organized on a local level; whereas indigenous peoples in Bolivia and Ecuador 
have organized successfully on a national level as well as achieved political 
representation in their countries’ legislative and executive branches of 
government (Yashar, p. 19).  Obviously, these facts demonstrate that strength in 
numbers is not the only precursor to successful indigenous mobilization at a 
national level. 
 Why were Ecuador’s and Bolivia’s environments more conducive for 
indigenous mobilization than the atmosphere of Peru?  For one, according to the 
Joshua Project, Peru contains 104 distinct ethnic groups (most of which are 
indigenous) while Ecuador has only 31 and Bolivia, 43 (Van Cott, p. 141).  For 
example, 65 different indigenous groups (who are separated by terrain and 
incommunicative due to language barriers) exist in Peru’s Amazonian region 
alone versus only 12 in Ecuador (Van Cott, p. 141).  As a result, language barriers 
and cultural differences impede Peruvian indigenous peoples’ abilities to 
compromise on issues, to collaborate, and to organize at a national level. 
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 Several historical and political factors, however, are more important 
impediments to indigenous mobilization in Peru.  According to Susan Stokes, the 
poor of Peru, are disproportionately indigenous, had an affinity for the elite and 
belief in the capitalist notion that hard work would contribute to “national 
progress (and, subsequently, individual, societal advancement)” of Peru from the 
1930s to 1960s (Stokes, p. 16).  Therefore, the poor relied on state officials to 
represent their needs.  During the Velasco Regime (1968-1975), the state 
ironically strengthened the labor movement by expanding unions, strengthening 
the Marxist Left, and promoting the Peruvian state in school curricula (Stokes, p. 
33).  As a result, the indigenous looked to labor unions and the Left to represent 
their interests rather than organizing on a national level to represent their own 
demands. 
Then, from the late-1970s to 1992, Sendero Luminoso arose in Peru’s 
political spectrum.  Espousing a communist doctrine and the use of brute force to 
obtain their vision, followers of Sendero Luminoso terrorized the country, 
especially in the highlands and rural areas of Peru where most of the indigenous 
peoples are located.  As a result, Sendero Luminoso successfully quelled 
indigenous mobilization unless it was through its communist organization.  After 
Sendero Luminoso fell in 1992, however, the Fujimori Regime continued a reign 
of terror by targeting and interrogating Peru’s citizens in order to remain in 
power.  Subsequently, the state of fear under the reign of Sendero Luminoso and 
the regime of Fujimori not only suppressed the mobilization of indigenous 
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peoples in Peru on a local, regional, and national level, but discouraged NGOs 
and neighboring countries from intervening in Peru (State of Fear, 2005). 
On the other hand, NGOs in Ecuador and Bolivia played a major role in 
sponsoring bicultural education for indigenous peoples, disseminating democratic 
ideals, and organizing the indigenous not only locally and nationally, but 
internationally as well.  Similarly, the indigenous movements of Ecuador and 
Bolivia received support from the state (through agrarian and constitutional 
reforms and through concessions made by government officials) while Peru’s 
government was a main contributor to the suppression of indigenous mobilization. 
Furthermore, the electoral laws in Ecuador and Bolivia were more lax than 
the electoral laws of Peru.  For example, while Ecuador was enfranchising 
illiterates and Bolivia’s government was decentralizing as well as sponsoring 
voter registration reforms that eventually were passed, Peru increased obstacles to 
ballot access by increasing the number of signatories that a national party had to 
acquire before registering from 100,000 to 480,000 signatories in 1995 (Van Cott, 
p. 163).  Finally, while Ecuador and Bolivia fostered national leaders to inspire 
the indigenous masses who were mobilizing, Peru lacked an influential leader to 
do the same for its indigenous population. 
Therefore, an analysis from the top-down and bottom-up will illustrate the 
factors that complicated indigenous mobilization locally, nationally, and 
internationally in Peru.  Studying the necessary conditions that Peru’s indigenous 
movement lacked compared to the indigenous movements of Ecuador and Bolivia 
is important since it demonstrates the effect that political landscapes, terrorism, 
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state leaders, and institutional structures can have on stigmatized peoples.  
Similarly, the three cases show the importance that international factors (such as 
the support of transnational actors, international forums, and other countries) can 
have on an underrepresented population.  In addition, the absence of revered local 
leaders and strong grassroots mobilization as well as the presence of cultural 
differences between indigenous ethnic groups are further hindrances to 
indigenous mobilization at the local level.  In other words, the lack of an 
indigenous movement in Peru was not caused by the omission of one element, but 
a multitude of factors that were present for the indigenous movements in Bolivia 
and Ecuador locally, nationally, and internationally. 
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Chapter I—The History 
Ecuador 
 Ecuador’s indigenous movement is probably the most renown and 
successful indigenous organization in South America.  Prompted by their desires 
to correct the hundreds of years of marginalization and discrimination 
promulgated by the Ecuadorian state, indígenas mobilized to induce change in 
their government. 
 Unsurprisingly, indigenous marginalization has been documented since 
the mid-sixteenth century.  Two major, stigmatized views that Spanish 
conquistadors held of indígenas are highlighted by a Franciscan friar, Bartolomé 
de las Casas, and Spain’s official court historian Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo 
(Gerlach, 2003: 19).  Bartolomé de las Casas believed, 
“God created these simple people [the indígenas] without evil and without guile.  ...They 
are most submissive, patient, peaceful, and virtuous.  Nor are they quarrelsome, 
rancorous, querulous, or vengeful.  They neither possess nor desire to possess worldly 
wealth (emphasis added) (Gerlach, 2003:19).” 
Bartolomé de las Casas instilled one racial stereotype of indigenous peoples that 
is still emphasized today—that the indígenas are simple and inferior people who 
are content tilling small plots of land since they “neither possess nor desire to 
possess worldly wealth (Gerlach, 2003: 19).” 
 In contrast, Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo viewed the indígenas as, 
“...naturally lazy and vicious, melancholic, cowardly, and in general a lying, shiftless 
people.  They are idolatrous, libidinous, and commit sodomy.  Their chief desire is to eat, 
drink, worship heathen idols, and commit bestial obscenities.  What could one expect 
from a people whose skulls are so thick and hard that the Spaniards had to take care in 
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fighting not to strike on the head lest their swords be blunted (emphasis added) (Gerlach, 
2003: 19)? 
Over the centuries, Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo’s view—that indígenas are 
lazy, untrustworthy, slow-witted heathens who practice backwards customs—has 
become the predominant racial stereotype of indígenas over Bartolomé de las 
Casas’ perspective (Gerlach, 2003: 19).  Nevertheless, both beliefs exist in 
modern Ecuador; and shape daily interactions between whites, mestizos, and 
indígenas (Gerlach, 2003: 19). 
 Subsequently, these views maintained the hacienda system practiced in 
Ecuadorian society until the 1960s.  Under the hacienda system, indigenous 
campesinos (or farm workers) were systematically tied to the land that was owned 
by a majority of whites who followed a modern system of feudalism.  Due to the 
hacienda system, being an indigenous person is primarily associated with being a 
campesino as well (Walsh, 2002: 63). 
 During the first half of the twentieth century, indígenas organized under a 
campesino identity to fight for land rights.  The campesino struggle for land rights 
can be traced back as early as 1926 when workers from a hacienda in Cayambe 
first protested for land.  These campesinos’ actions would eventually lead to the 
formation of the Ecuadorian Socialist Party (PSE).  In 1936, the Ecuadorian 
government passed the Ley de comunas (Commune Law).  Under the Ley de 
comunas, the government recognized peasant and indigenous communities 
outside of haciendas; and permitted communities with fifty or more members to 
form their own local governments (also known as cabildos) and to collectively 
own property (also known as comunas).  Comunas were then linked institutionally 
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to the state through local parishes (parroquias).  Although the Ley de comunas 
was an advancement for the campesino movement (for it enabled further 
organization), indigenous organization was still dependent on permission granted 
by the state (Van Cott, p. 103). 
 In the 1940s, the PSE organized highland indígenas through a network of 
unions under a campesino identity.  The PSE enabled these highland indígenas to 
form the Ecuadorian Federation of Indians (FEI) in 1944 in order to demand an 
end of the hacienda system and the recognition of their land titles.  In 1964, the 
government passed an agrarian reform law that ended the feudal relationship 
between campesinos and hacienda owners (Van Cott, p. 103). 
Due to the reform of the hacienda system, indígenas organized to demand 
communal lands, autonomous control over natural resources, and access to 
agricultural assistance programs during the 1960s and 1970s amidst a region-wide 
economic crisis in Latin America.  Despite the economic meltdown in Latin 
America, however, indigenous mobilization in Ecuador boomed for reasons that 
will be addressed in Chapter II.  In the early-1980s, indigenous leaders would 
eventually run as political candidates for leftist and center-leftist political parties 
(Van Cott, p. 103-104). 
The success and progress of the social movement can be highlighted by 
four major events of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement: the 1990 Intí Raymi 
levantamiento (or uprising), the 1992 levantamiento in Quito, a Quito protest on 
February 5, 1997, and the coup of January 2000.  The Intí Raymi levantamiento of 
1990 was the first national protest of the indigenous movement that began to 
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challenge how lo blanco-mestizo (people of white or mixed descent) viewed lo 
indígena (people of indigenous descent) (Walsh, 2002: 68).  Since the indigenous 
peoples were able to organize on a national, political level to directly challenge 
the white patrón, the indígenas challenged the assumption that Indians are tied to 
the countryside, artisan work, or manual labor; and that they were anxious to 
become “civilized” mestizos (Walsh, 2002: 68). 
Likewise, the 1992 march from the Pastaza province to Quito also 
demonstrates the influence of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement.  On April 
11, 1992, two thousand indígenas from the Pastaza province marched to Quito to 
demand adjudication of land and constitutional reform that would recognize 
indigenous land, social, and political rights as well as the plurinationality of 
Ecuadorian society (Sawyer, 1997: 1).  The levantamiento had varied support.  
Indígenas from the highlands graciously housed and fed the lowland supporters 
while some supporters from the press, police, Red Cross, and blanco-mestizo 
enclaves cheered for the indígenas’ stance against President Sixto Durán Ballén’s 
unpopular regime (Sawyer, 1997: 2). 
A majority of conservative Ecuadorians, however, viewed the indigenous 
protest as a threat to Ecuador’s national sovereignty (Sawyer, 1997: 15).  For 
example, two military reports along with an Acuerdo Territorial of 1990 stated 
that the Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Pastaza (OPIP) (which funded the 
levantamiento) was associated with “countries linked to international guerrilla 
groups” that were determined to establish “an indigenous state with its own 
territory, language, and race” (Sawyer, 1997: 16).  As a result, the white elite was 
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fearful of the indígenas’ rebelliousness and afraid that “they [were] capable of 
doing anything to [them]” (Sawyer, 1997: 17). 
Similarly, the indigenous protest in Quito on February 5, 1997 was 
another successful extension of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement.  Indígenas 
protested on February 5
th
 to demand the impeachment of President Abdalá 
Bucaram as well as to push for adherence to the 1994 platform of the 
Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) (Andolina, 
2003: 731).  In its Proyecto Político, CONAIE proposed that Ecuador should 
convert to a consociational democracy that reserves thirty percent of the seats in 
Ecuador’s National Congress to be chosen by indigenous communities; includes 
indigenous representation in all government agencies; preserves the autonomy of 
indigenous regions by officializing indigenous justice systems and languages; 
grants veto power to indígenas in all affairs concerning their agendas; creates a 
multicultural, bilingual education system; and establishes a constituent assembly 
(Andolina, 2003: 729). 
According to governmental elites, however, democracy does not guarantee 
minority rights for it is “rule by the majority” (Andolina, 2003: 241).  Since they 
were influenced by liberal, Orientalist ideals and their own history, elites believed 
“backwardness” in their society was superimposed by indigenous culture and 
Spain’s legacy (Andolina, 2003: 732).  As a result, the solution to correct 
Ecuador’s “backwardness” was to adopt Western European and North American 
systems, such as a neo-liberal market (Andolina, 2003: 732-733).  Ecuador’s 
problems were also attributed to the lack of Protestant values practiced in society 
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(Andolina, 2003: 733). Individuals with Protestant values were expected to 
possess a disciplined work ethic, an inclination to save, a respect for laws and 
political authority, and personal fulfillment through personal effort (Andolina, 
2003: 733).  As a result, anyone who lacked these values (such as an indígena) 
was considered to be backward (Andolina, 2003: 733).  Similarly, this view does 
not allow for cultural difference.  Rather, it reemphasizes personal responsibility 
and reinforces the Ecuadorian homogenous, national identity that “everyone is 
simply Ecuadorian” united through mestizaje (Andolina, 2003: 741). 
Despite the predominance of negative racial stereotypes of indígenas, 
Ecuador’s indigenous movement is still considered one of the most successful 
mobilization efforts by indígenas in Latin American for various reasons (Almeida 
Vinueza, 2005: 94).  For example, the movement achieved a majority of its 
demands.  Due to the 1992 levantamiento, indígenas gained official land rights 
over ancestral plots that amounted to 1,115,175 hectares (about 2.75 million 
acres) in Pastaza province (Sawyer, 1997: 4).  Similarly, subsequent to the protest 
on February 5, 1997, the government adopted the indigenas’ demands for a 
constituent assembly (installed on December 20, 1997) (Andolina, 2003: 743).  In 
addition, the indigenous movement successfully persuaded the government to 
pass a constitutional reform in 1998 that officially recognized indígenas and Afro-
Ecuadorians as legal nationalities; established collective rights for these groups; 
and included that Ecuador was a plurinational, multicultural society (Walsh, 2002: 
75). 
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The constitutional reforms of 1998 sparked a transformation within the 
indigenous movement as well (Walsh, 2002: 76).  Since the indigenous movement 
achieved national recognition of minority rights, culturally different groups, such 
as Afro-Ecuadorians and sects of indigenous cultures, deemed their union 
unnecessary for future goals (Walsh, 2002: 75-76).  As a result, indigenous 
organizations began to divide into specialized organizations that recognized the 
“micro-identities” of indígenas and Afro-Ecuadorians (Walsh, 2002: 76).  For 
example, before 1998, CONAIE only recognized 11 indigenous nationalities 
(Walsh, 2002: 76).  After 1998, however, seventeen new indigenous nationalities 
emerged that claimed to have existed before the arrival of the imperialistic Incas 
(Walsh, 2002: 76). 
Similarly, CONAIE severed its ties with Afro-Ecuadorian organizations 
(Walsh, 2002: 76).  Likewise, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of 
the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONPLADEIN) replaced the Development Council of 
Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador (CODENPE) (Walsh, 2002: 76).  As a 
result, CODENPE’s goals changed from promoting minority rights to ensuring 
that all twenty-eight indigenous nacionalidades y pueblos were represented in 
Ecuador’s government (Walsh, 2002: 76).  Naturally, division within the 
indigenous movement created polarities within the movement that hindered its 
solidarity and ability to influence governmental policy (Wolff, 2007: 19). 
To further debilitate the indigenous movement, the government tried to 
incorporate indigenous leaders and organizations into agencies of the state 
(Almeida Vinueza, 2005: 100).  For example, in 1988, President Rodrigo Borja 
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officialized bilingual education and appointed an indigenous linguist to oversee 
the proceedings.  Similarly, the Office of Indigenous Affairs was established by 
President Sixto Durán Ballén and the Ethnic Ministry, by President Abdalá 
Bucaram (Walsh, 2002: 72).  Through clientelist integration, the government 
wished to weaken the indigenous movement in order to maintain control over the 
indigenous and black populace, which it achieved after the regime of President 
Lucio Gutiérrez Barbúa (Wolff, 2007: 26).  As a result, clientelist integration can 
be viewed as a method used by the state to enforce its hegemonic ideals in order 
to stifle the influence of cultural diversity, a counter-hegemonic value. 
In January 2000, the indigenous movement reached the peak of its power 
when the Junta of National Salvation, Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez Barbúa of the 
Ecuadorian military, leader Antonio Vargas Guatatuca of CONAIE, and populist 
lawyer Carlos Solózano Constantini from Guayaquil overthrew President Jamil 
Mahuad (Almeida Vinueza, 2005: 97).  Although united by a common goal to 
overthrow the government, each leader had his own agenda.  For example, the 
principle objectives of CONAIE were to transform Ecuador into an intercultural 
and plurinational society; establish social justice; and ensure the equitable 
treatment of all citizens (Almeida Vinueza, 2005: 97-98).  On the other hand, the 
soldiers wanted to maintain the strength of the Ecuadorian state, but eliminate 
corruption within government (Almeida Vinueza, 2005: 98).  The indigenous 
movement remained allied with the military until Vice President Gustavo Noboa 
Bejarano came to power (who had similar views to former President Mahuad) 
(Almeida Vinueza, 2005: 98). 
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When Gutiérrez came to power in January of 2003, he further intensified 
divisions within the indigenous movement (Wolff, 2007: 25).  To contain it, 
Gutiérrez appointed indigenous groups to head certain social institutions and 
government agencies in exchange for their allegiances (Almeida Vinueza, 2005: 
100).  Likewise, Gutiérrez rewarded local indigenous communities who supported 
his policies (Wolff, 2007: 25).  For example, he donated pickets and shovels to 
indigenous municipalities and promised to build new roads in the Amazonian 
region if the local communities pledged their allegiance to his regime (Wolff, 
2007: 25).  Similarly, since the indigenous movement had been incorporated into 
the government through several state agencies and the establishment of 
Pachakutik (an indigenous political party) in 1996, levantamientos were 
unthinkable at this stage since they now had to work with the government to meet 
their demands (Wolff, 2007: 25).  As a result, clientelist integration and the 
Gutiérrez regime weakened the influence of the indigenous movement over state 
policy and governance (Almeida Vinueza, 2005: 105). 
For these reasons, clientelist integration can be viewed as an attempt by 
the state to maintain control over counter-hegemonic insurgencies, such as the 
indígenas and Afro-Ecuadorians.  Although the indigenous movement has 
weakened since the constitutional reforms of 1998 and the coup of January 2000, 
it still has had influence over the Ecuadorian state.  Given Ecuador’s historic 
illusion of a homogenous society united through mestizaje, it was a remarkable 
feat and triumph that the indígenas and Afro-Ecuadorians persuaded the national 
government to announce publicly and record legally that it was a plurinational, 
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multicultural society in reality.  Its indigenous movement, therefore, has still 
achieved revolutionary accomplishments. 
Bolivia 
 Like Ecuador’s indigenous movement, Bolivia’s national indigenous 
movement has had great success and influence.  As in Ecuador, Bolivia’s 
indigenous movement began as a campesino struggle during the mid-twentieth 
century (Van Cott, p. 52-53).  For example, after the 1952 revolution, the 
National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) Party incorporated campesinos (who 
were mostly comprised of indigenous Bolivians) into a state-sponsored síndicato 
(or union) structure (Van Cott, p. 52-53).  As a result, like Ecuador’s indigenous 
movement, Bolivia’s highland indigenous organization began as a campesino 
movement that focused on workers’ rights and land titles. 
 In 1968, campesinos began to openly criticize the state.  Since they did not 
favor his new tax plan, indigenous campesinos in the highlands openly criticized 
General Barrientos for the first time.  Inspired by their protests, other campesinos 
formed independent organizations apart from MNR.  Eventually, campesinos 
transformed these organizations into a radical, political movement (Van Cott, p. 
53). 
 As a result, the Katarista movement emerged in the Aymara highlands of 
La Paz during the late-1960s.
1
  Within the Katarista movement, there were two 
                                                 
1
 The Katarista movement took “its name from the late-eighteenth century Aymara leader Julián 
Apaza who led a rebellion against colonial rule under…Tupak Katari.”  Indigenous organizations 
that bear Katari’s name can be divided into two ideological camps—Indianism and Katarism.  
While Indianism places an emphasis on indigenous marginalization and is “overly anti-Western 
and antiwhite,” Katarism “blends class consciousness with ethnic rights claims and calls for the 
reconstruction of the Bolivian state along ethnic criteria” (Van Cott, p. 53). 
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ideological camps—Indianism and Katarism—that both had great influence over 
Bolivia’s indigenous organization and government.  For example, in the early-
1970s, Kataristas and Indianists took over the National Confederation of Peasant 
Workers of Bolivia (CNTCB).  Due to the Banzer coup, however, independent 
indigenous political activity was impeded (Van Cott, p. 53-54). 
 Nevertheless, Katarist Genaro Flores espoused the Manifesto of 
Tiahuanacu in 1973 after he returned from exile in Chile in 1972.  Similarly in 
1973, the massacre of 13 Quechua campesinos in Tolata, Cochabamba served as 
an impetus for the Katarista movement in the Aymara highlands.  In particular, 
independent campesino activities surged in 1978 (Van Cott, p. 54-55). 
 In 1979, the Katarista movement strengthened its national activities when 
the Bolivian Workers Central (COB) convened in a congress.  From this 
convention the COB established the Unitary Syndical Confederation of Peasant 
Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB), which became a major player in the indigenas’ 
struggle for land titles and equal rights.  For example, in December 1979, 
CSUTCB staged a roadblock outside of La Paz that paralyzed transportation and 
the flow of food to cities for over a week (Van Cott, p. 55). 
 During the mid-1980s, CSUTCB allowed non-delegates of its organization 
(such as academics as well as representatives of political parties and of Non-
governmental Organizations (NGOs)) to attend its congresses (Van Cott, p. 56).  
In the late-1980s, member-power of the CSUTCB shifted from the Aymara 
Katarists to the Quechua-speaking coca growers (Van Cott, p. 57).  After the 
power shift and a road blockade in 1983, the Katarista movement began 
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mobilizing politically (Van Cott, p. 57).  The political influence of the Bolivian 
highland indigenous movement escalated during the 1990s as CSUTCB leaders 
began running for office as the heads of their political parties (Van Cott, p. 59). 
 Similar to Ecuador’s lowland indigenous mobilization, lowland indigenas 
in Bolivia organized later than their highland counterparts.  For instance, in 1976, 
indigenous organization began demanding indigenous rights for inhabitants of the 
eastern lowlands.  Independent local and regional organizations did not form in 
the lowlands until two years later (which intensified during the 1980s) (Van Cott, 
p. 60). 
 With the help of NGOs that assisted the Indigenous Communities of 
Eastern Bolivia, the Guaraní held a meeting in 1978.  After their organization, the 
Guaraní reached out to other lowland indigenous groups (such as the Ayoreo, 
Chiquitanos, and Guarayos) during the early-1980s.  Subsequently, the Guaraní, 
Ayoreo, Chiquitanos, and Guarayos formed the Indigenous Confederation of the 
East and Amazon of Bolivia (CIDOB) in 1982 (Van Cott, p. 60). 
 To ensure the durability and success of newly formed lowland indigenous 
organizations, financial and private development institutions, NGOs, and 
churches provided financial and technical aid to lowland indigenous groups.  As a 
result, the lowland indigenous organizations grew into a successful, national 
movement to push for land titles and other demands.  For instance, the Indigenous 
Peoples Central of the Beni (CPIB) organized the “March for Territory and 
Dignity” in 1990 that achieved CPIB’s main goal—for lowland indigenas to be 
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granted the collective title of more than two million hectares of ancestral land 
(which grew to 9 million hectares after a presidential decree) (Van Cott, p. 60). 
 From 1992 to 1994, CIDOB formed the Ethnic Coordinator of Santa Cruz 
(CESC) to represent the demands of indigenous inhabitants in Santa Cruz 
nationally and internationally.  Subsequently, CIDOB collaborated with CSUTCB 
(the main highland indigenous organization) and the Syndical Confederation of 
Bolivian Colonists (CSCB) in 1996 to protest the Sánchez de Lozada 
administration’s agrarian reform law.  After its confrontation, CIDOB reached the 
peak of its political power when it compromised with the Bolivian government 
that it would abandon its march in exchange for governmental recognition and 
incorporation of CIDOB’s key demands (Van Cott, p. 61). 
 Although CIDOB deteriorated as an organization after 1997, the national 
indigenous movement of Bolivia remained influential politically (Van Cott, p. 61-
62).  For example, the Quechua Evo Morales became Bolivia’s first indigenous 
president in 2006 running as a candidate for the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) 
party (Stiglitz, p. 1).  Recently, Morales pushed for a new bill of rights, with a 
chapter dedicated to Bolivia’s 36 indigenous peoples, to be added to Bolivia’s 
constitution (Piette, p. 1).  It was ratified by Congress in February 2009 (New 
Bolivia Constitution in Force, p. 1).  As a result, although Ecuador’s indigenous 
movement has waned since the beginning of the twenty-first century due to 
clientelism, Bolivia’s national indigenous movement has maintained its strength 
to the benefit of its political aims and influence. 
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Peru 
 Peru’s national indigenous movement has lagged behind the indigenous 
political successes of Ecuador and Bolivia.  Although Peruvian indígenas have 
organized on a local level, a mass movement on the national level did not develop 
at any time in recent decades. 
 Interestingly, Peru’s early history of indigenous organization paralleled 
indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia.  Like Ecuador and Bolivia, Peru’s 
indigenous organization began as a labor movement.  During the militaristic 
administration of Fernando Belaúnde Terry in the late-1960s, shantytown 
dwellers cognizant of worker rights began to mobilize (Stokes, p. 32).  Under the 
Velasco regime (1968-1975), the labor movement was strengthened (Stokes, p. 
33).  For instance, President Velasco legally recognized several unions; passed a 
job security law in 1970; and persuaded the government to recognize communist-
affiliated organizations (such as the General Affiliation of Workers of Peru 
(CGTP)) (Stokes, p. 33-35).  Due to the allowance of labor union formation 
during the late-1960s through 1970s, it would seem that Peru’s environment 
would eventually foster a strong indigenous movement at the national level 
evolved from Peru’s early labor movement activities. 
 Since it permitted labor unionization, however, the Peruvian government 
also allowed unfavorable organizations (in eyes of the political elite and 
establishment) to form and to mobilize support.  New parties that professed 
Marxist ideologies emerged and competed for poblador support.  Of course, the 
Marxist ideals that these new parties represented conflicted with the military rule 
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of Peru’s government.  Subsequently, pobladores organized more demonstrations 
to demand better welfare and the end of military rule during the late-1970s.  
When Peru’s real salaries and wages declined in 1975 (which increased poverty 
among the lower classes that primarily consisted of pobladores), pobladores 
believed a change in Peru’s system of government would provide better welfare 
and representation of the lower classes (Stokes, p. 45-47). 
 Although presidential and parliamentary elections were held for the first 
time in twelve years in March 1980, other organizations believed Peru’s 
government was still corrupt.  In particular, Sendero Luminoso (or the Shining 
Path) espoused that Peru’s problems could be solved only by a cleansing 
revolution.  During the 1970s, Abimael Guzmán, Sendero Luminoso’s leader, 
modeled Sendero Luminoso after Mao’s Cultural Revolution in China.  Sendero 
Luminoso claimed that everything must be destroyed since it was contaminated by 
a system of capitalism and feudalism.  Similarly, Sendero Luminoso believed 
Peruvians who did not support its organization needed to be obliterated as well 
(State of Fear, 2005). 
 To limit Sendero Luminoso’s growing influence and reign of violence, the 
Belaúnde administration sent the armed forces to Sendero Luminoso’s known 
whereabouts in 1982.  Since Sendero Luminoso was head-quartered in the Andes 
Mountains, the organization was in constant contact with indígenas.  When the 
armed forces arrived, they had trouble distinguishing between Sendero Luminoso 
members and civilians.  As a result, indigenous populations were often terrorized 
by the military and by Sendero Luminoso throughout the 1970s and 1980s.  The 
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terrorization of indigenous populations escalated in 1985 when the García 
administration established emergency zones in the Andes Mountains and 
Amazonian regions that granted the military full control of the areas (State of 
Fear, 2005). 
 Due to the violent nature of Sendero Luminoso, democratically-elected 
President Alberto Fujimori had high approval ratings in the early-1990s despite 
his autogolpe that dissolved Peru’s Congress (García Calderón, p. 57).  When 
Sendero Luminoso’s popularity waned in 1990 due to a failed attack on Lima, 
President Fujimori’s justification for absolute executive control over state affairs 
disappeared (State of Fear, 2005).  To maintain his authoritarian rule, President 
Fujimori established the first media dictatorship in Latin America; and began 
interrogating Peru’s citizens for fabricated crimes (García Calderón, p. 50).
2
  
After Fujimori amended Peru’s constitution in order to run for a third-term as 
president in the 2000 election, Peruvians were outraged (García Calderón, p. 55-
56).  Near the 2000 election, the media had recently released the Vladivideos that 
documented the government’s corruption in Peru (García Calderón, p. 47).  
Therefore, citizens believed Fujimori’s amendment to the constitution was 
another instance of political corruption (García Calderón, p. 55-56).  As a result, 
Fujimori fled from Peru to Japan in 2000 when street protests escalated after his 
re-election (García Calderón, p. 56). 
 Therefore, although Peru’s indigenous movement began like the national 
indigenous movements of Bolivia and Ecuador¸ political and social factors at the 
                                                 
2
 A media dictatorship exists when a regime exerts direct or indirect control over much of its 
country’s mass media.  As a result, the media becomes a puppet of the rulers in power.  In Peru’s 
case, the media dictator was the Fujimori administration (García Calderón, p. 50). 
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local and national level interfered with the escalation of Peru’s indigenous 
mobilization.  An in-depth analysis of the progression of each indigenous 
movement in Chapters II to IV will further explain Peru’s pitfalls as well as 
Ecuador’s and Bolivia’s successes.
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Chapter II—Indigenous Successes 
The Cases of Ecuador and Bolivia 
 
 Throughout the evolution of their indigenous movements, Ecuador and 
Bolivia exhibited similar factors that attributed to the successful mobilization of 
indígenas.
3
  The efforts of transnational actors at the international level, the 
involvement of the state at the national level as well as the influence of leaders 
and impact of bicultural education at the local level helped the Ecuadorian and 
Bolivian indigenous movements evolve to their pinnacles today. 
 
The Role of Transnational Actors 
 The impact of transnational actors is evident in the twentieth century.  As 
communication increases and technology advances, information is being 
disseminated at a quicker and easier pace than thirty years ago.  Naturally, 
transnational actors play a role in the mass communication of information.  Why, 
however, are transnational actors important contributors to the successes of 
indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador? 
 According to Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, “transnational 
advocacy provides material and information resources that enable movements to 
act effectively for change” (cited in Andolina et al, p. 681).  For instance, when 
indígenas in Ecuador and Bolivia were faced with state opposition, they turned to 
                                                 
3
 In Ecuador, indigenous population estimates range from figures of 30 to 38 percent.  In Bolivia, 
estimates of its indigenous population range from 60 to 70 percent (Yashar, p. 19). 
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international organizations (such as the Coordinadora de Organizaciones 
Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazonica (COICA) or the Amazon and the South Meso-
American Indian Rights Center (SAIIC)) for support—a phenomenon that Keck 
and Sikkink denote as the “Boomerang Effect” (cited in Andolina et al, p. 681).  
Although some indigenous peoples managed to mobilize without any 
international support from transnational actors, NGOs provided indigenous 
organizations with an additional impetus to continue protesting for their demands; 
and with funding that made indigenous mobilization easier to sustain (Andolina et 
al, p. 682). 
 Through transnational advocacy, indigenous organizations were able to 
develop a network of actors highly committed to indigenous rights that promoted 
ethno-development.  As a result, this ethno-development network enabled 
indígenas to transmit common criteria through NGOs, bilateral agencies, and 
multilateral organizations.  In addition, the sponsored development of ethnicity 
challenged modernization theory by rejecting the idea that traditional, cultural 
values were backward practices and obstacles to progress since it valued tradition 
as the engine for development instead.  For example, indigenous culture and 
demands (such as ancestral and traditional knowledge, land titles, and the practice 
of collective labor (or mingas)) became important sources of human capital.  
Through financing, transnational actors helped indígenas to transform their social 
capital into productivity and wealth; and, therefore, to mobilize (Andolina et al, p. 
689). 
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 More importantly, however, transnational actors enabled indigenous 
peoples in Ecuador and Bolivia to network and to form relationships with one 
another at the transnational level, which strengthened their movements overall.  
According to Daniel Mato, since the 1970s, the development of transnational 
relationships has been necessary for social movements in Latin America due to 
the persistence of political repression (such as military regimes), unfavorable 
economic conditions (such as external debt crises, structural adjustment programs, 
and compensatory social programs), and negative global factors (such as U.S. 
supported coup d’états and regional depressions) (Mato, p. 349).  Therefore, 
transnational networking provided an outlet for indigenous organizations to 
escape systematic obstacles and for indigenous leaders to participate in events 
organized by global agents.  Daniel Mato also claims that global agents have an 
advantage in forming networks over local agents due to their “amount of 
transnational experience in managing information; [and] privileged access to 
archives, libraries, and other documentation sources that store products 
of…scholarly research” (Mato, p. 349). 
In the cases of Ecuador and Bolivia, global agents hosted a multitude of 
networking opportunities for indígenas during the 1990s.  In the United States, 
New York City hosted the New York Amazon Week.  Similarly, the United 
Nations declared 1993 as the “Year of the World’s Indigenous Peoples.”  The UN 
Declaration also inspired the establishment of a “Decade of Indigenous Peoples,” 
which provided further opportunities for indigenous representatives to meet 
fellow mobilizers from other Latin American countries; to share identities; as well 
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as to organize and to promote agendas at a national and transnational level (Mato, 
p. 350-351). 
 Overall, transnational organizations have promulgated indigenous 
mobilization by counterbalancing the threat that states and corporations pose 
nationally and transnationally (Mato, p. 354).  Transnational organizations also 
have strategized with indigenous groups to aid the indígenas in their proposals to 
the state (Mato, p. 354).  For example, in the late-1980s, global-local partnerships 
between transnational actors and local indigenous groups contributed to broader 
debates about legal reforms within Bolivia that led to constitutional reform in the 
1990s (Andolina et al, p. 685). 
In the late-1990s, transnational actors also opened new possibilities for the 
Bolivian ayllu movement nationally and transnationally in three ways.  First, 
transnational actors protected ayullus as well as offered culturally-appropriate 
development plans throughout the late-1980s and early-1990s.  Although 
transnational actor involvement was less prominent in the Bolivian highlands 
since CSUTCB downplayed indígenas’ vulnerability, their involvement still had 
an impact on Bolivia’s national indigenous movement overall.  For instance, 
international organizations began connecting with Bolivian Indianists post-1985 
to form global-local partnerships.  The global-local partnerships between Bolivian 
Indianists and international organizations countered other grassroots organizations 
sponsoring development plans associated with Marxism, liberation theology, and 
Western modernization (Andolina et al, p. 685-686). 
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 In particular, the Andean Oral History Workshop, established in 1983, 
strengthened Bolivia’s indigenous movement.  Headquartered in La Paz, the 
Andean Oral History Workshop consisted of indigenous intellectuals who were 
raised in Bolivian ayllus (but received graduate degrees in foreign countries).  
Since it documented and transmitted Bolivian oral history derived from 
indigenous languages, the workshop played a crucial role in regenerating 
indigenous culture (Andolina et al, p. 686). 
 Then, in 1986, the Andean Oral History Workshop collaborated with 
Oxfam (Andolina et al, p. 686).  As the workshop provided advisors and Oxfam 
administered funds, the two organizations worked together on a development 
project in North Potosí (Andolina et al, p. 687).  Since their co-operation 
disproved the assumption that development practices and union organization are 
inherently neo-colonial undertakings, the development project run by the Andean 
Oral History Workshop and Oxfam legitimized indigenous ayllus for the Bolivian 
state and international community (Andolina et al, p. 687).  Since its crux was 
ayllus, Bolivia’s national indigenous movement was strengthened at the national 
and international levels of its operation. 
 In addition, the European Union initiated a development project in North 
Oruro in 1987.  Dubbed the Campesino Self-Development Project, the European 
Union formed a global-local partnership with Ayllu Sartañani (a local NGO) 
(Andolina et al, p. 687).  Through its involvement, the European Union concluded 
that ayllus in Bolivia were the basis of its indigenous movement (Andolina et al, 
p. 687).  As a result, it held debates on cultural identity and community 
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representation that were attended by mallkus (or ethnic authorities) rather than 
peasant union leaders to represent their indigenous communities (Andolina et al, 
p. 687).  By 1989, the Campesino Self-Development Project helped ayllu 
members to express their economic concerns through their ayllu network; to 
organize other ayllus in North Oruro around a Karankas, ethnic identity; and to 
redefine their land title claims to pre-colonial boundaries after assessing and 
analyzing colonial land titles (Andolina et al, p. 687).  Therefore, through Ayllu 
Sartañani, a transnational actor (the European Union) strengthened Bolivia’s 
indigenous movement at the grassroots that evolved into a more formidable 
regional movement via the provisions of the Campesino Self-Development 
Project. 
 Since they protected ayllus and sponsored development projects, 
transnational actors helped validate indigenous identities and leadership as well 
(Andolina et al, p. 687).  For instance, the Andean Oral History Workshop helped 
to disaggregate Aymara and Quechua language-based identities in Bolivia by 
documenting indigenous culture that was then shared with other indigenous 
communities (Andolina et al, p. 686).  As a result, Quechua- and Aymara-
speaking indígenas could then form smaller-scale identities based on common 
local customs, history, and land rights via the network created by the global-local 
partnership between the Andean Oral History Workshop and Oxfam (Andolina et 
al, p. 687).  Transnational actors also helped affirm ethnicity-based identities over 
class-based identities through the documentation of culture (by projects such as 
the Andean Oral History Workshop) as well as through the analysis of the 
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importance of ayllus (via projects such as the Campesino Self-Development 
Project) (Andolina et al, p. 687).  Subsequently, the validation of indigenous 
identities and leadership by transnational actors strengthened Bolivia’s indigenous 
movement at the local, national, and international levels. 
 Second, transnational actors in Bolivia helped nurture developmentally-
appropriate culture through the cultivation of indigenous social capital (Andolina 
et al, p. 689).  For example, international development organizations (such as the 
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank) implemented their own 
ethnic policies in Bolivia based on neoliberalism (Andolina et al, p. 689).  In the 
mid-1990s, these multilateral development banks established indigenous affairs 
teams (Andolina et al, p. 689).  This allowed Bolivian indigenous peoples to 
negotiate with other indigenous representatives and government officials about 
their demands (Andolina et al, p. 689).  Due to open communication between the 
Bolivian state and indigenous representatives sponsored by multilateral 
development banks, indígenas influenced their government to reorient its 
indigenous ministry around development that recognized an indigenous cultural 
identity (Andolina et al, p. 689).  Similarly, the Bolivian state implemented 
legislation to assuage the plight of its indigenous peoples (Andolina et al, p. 689-
690).  As a result, since development banks cultivated indigenous social capital 
and aimed it at the Bolivian state, Bolivian indígenas were able to have their 
demands recognized by the government—an example that demonstrates the 
evolution of Bolivia’s indigenous movement from a local to a national operation. 
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 Ethno-cultural agendas were also employed by international development 
agencies through the Bolivian Indigenous Ministry, Popular Participation 
Ministry, and Land Reform Institutes.  Based on a social, neo-liberal 
governmentality, these ethno-cultural agendas further opened new possibilities for 
ayllus.  Ultimately, since ayllus were viewed by international development 
agencies as cultivators of social capital and communal participation on a local 
scale, ethno-development networks of international agencies believed they could 
reproduce the successful, organizational model of Ecuador’s indigenous 
movement via ayllus.  For example, the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of 
the Bolivian Lowlands (CIDOB), an organization that identified more than thirty 
indigenous groups according to language use, local territorial claims, and 
traditional authority systems of capitanías, was viewed as comparable to the 
Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) for its ability to 
facilitate dialogue and construct proposals (Andolina et al, p. 690-691). 
 Similarly, in Ecuador, the Association of Indigenous Workers of 
Mondayacu (ATIAM) changed its names to the Association of Communities of the 
Kijus People (ACOPUKI) in late-1999 due to an ethnic revival of culture 
discovered by foreign researchers.  After historians and anthropologists 
determined that the indigenous groups of ATIAM were descendents of the Kijus 
(a people thought to be decimated by the Spanish conquest), they influenced 
indigenous community leaders to embrace their newly-discovered, ancestral 
culture.  As a result, ACOPUKI encouraged its members to relearn Quichua as 
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well as emphasized organization based on nacionalidades and pueblos as 
CONAIE had done in Ecuador (Perreault, p. 79). 
 Finally, transnational actors helped decentralize multi-cultural categories 
and nation-state reform in Bolivia.  For instance, the government ratified policies 
that engaged with ayllus more during its indigenous movement than its peasant 
movement.  In 1991, Bolivia’s government ratified the International Labor 
Organization (ILO)’s Convention 169, which recognized peoples according to 
their maintenance of tradition and attachment to local territory.  As a result, 
Bolivia parted from its uniform credo that disregarded the rise of indigenous 
identities.  In addition, Bolivia’s government also recognized CONAMAQ as a 
legitimate representative of the highland indigenous peoples.  Like CSUTCB, it 
also granted CONAMAQ consultative space within its Indigenous Ministry 
(Andolina et al, p. 687-688). 
 In 1995, the Bolivian government also passed the Law of Popular 
Participation.  Under the Law of Popular Participation, the government 
recognized ayllus as “territorial grassroots organizations.”  The Law of Popular 
Participation also registered communities as either peasant-oriented or 
indigenous-oriented.  As a result, through the Law of Popular Participation, the 
Bolivian government dissociated “peasants” from indígenas; and, thereby, 
unraveled the prevailing identity construction of the peasant movement (Andolina 
et al, p. 688). 
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Involvement by the State 
 Like transnational actors, the actions of the Bolivian and Ecuadorian state 
played a substantial role in the success and evolution of their indigenous 
movements.  Through the recognition of indigenous organizations, passage of 
laws, incorporation of indigenous institutions into government, and constitutional 
reform, the Bolivian and Ecuadorian state legitimized the demands and existence 
of mobilized indigenous groups.  For example, the recognition of indigenous 
organizations by the state (such as CSUTCB in Bolivia) validated the 
mobilization of indígenas as well as the role of indigenous organizations as 
representatives of indigenous demands (Andolina et al, p. 687).  As a result, when 
the Ecuadorian and Bolivian state recognized certain indigenous organizations, 
the representative power of these institutions grew as well as the strength of their 
respective indigenous movements. 
 Likewise, the ratification of laws by the Ecuadorian and Bolivian state 
broke down restrictive barriers for indigenous organizations as well as granted 
demands advocated by the indigenous movements.  As discussed above, the 
ratification of the ILO’s Convention 169 in 1991 and the Law of Popular 
Participation in 1995 by the Bolivian state bolstered Bolivia’s indigenous 
movement since it recognized indígenas by their traditions and territorial claims 
rather than by their economic status as campesinos (Andolina et al, p. 688).  
Therefore, the Bolivian state acknowledged that the indígenas were not only 
protesting for a better economic status, but for state recognition of their culture, of 
their stigmatization, and of their indigenous identity (Andolina et al, p. 688).  
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Through recognition of indigenous identities via laws, the state further legitimized 
the agenda of the Bolivian indigenous movement. 
 Similarly, agrarian reform by the Ecuadorian and Bolivian state further 
strengthened their indigenous movements at the national level.  For instance, the 
Bolivian state instituted agrarian reform in 1996 (Andolina et al, p. 688).  
Although it pressured indígenas to sell their land, the 1996 agrarian reform law 
created a freer land movement by increasing competition and by permitting the 
legalization of original community lands (Andolina et al, p. 688).  Similarly, 
agrarian reform in Ecuador in 1964 and in 1973 as well as sponsored rural 
development programs during the 1980s enabled indigenous mobilization 
(Perreault, p. 67).  As Leon Zamosc explains, agrarian reform during the 1960s 
eliminated servile relations on haciendas for it made huasipungueros legal owners 
of their subsistence plots (Zamosc, p. 42).
4
  Likewise, agrarian reform during the 
1970s transferred some hacienda lands to campesinos in a state attempt to 
modernize society (Zamosc, p. 42).
5
  As a result, agrarian reform in Ecuador 
began to dismantle its rigid hacienda system as did agrarian reform in Bolivia. 
 In addition, constitutional reform passed by the Ecuadorian and Bolivian 
states played a pivotal role in the success of their indigenous movements.  With 
the approval of certain constitutional reforms, the Ecuadorian and Bolivian states 
granted the demands of the indígenas as well as changed social relations within 
their countries.  Acting in response to the strength of their indigenous movements, 
                                                 
4
 Huasipungueros are “peasant families who labored…for landowners in exchange for small 
subsistence plots and low supplementary wages” (Zamosc, p. 42). 
5
 For example, the Ecuadorian government redistributed about a quarter of hacienda land plots.  
Soon, hacienda owners began to sell their remaining plots privately for profit (Zamosc, p. 42). 
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both Ecuador and Bolivia passed constitutional reforms that recognized their 
nations as plurinational, multicultural states during the 1990s (Otero et al, p. 517).  
Prior to the 1990s, a big controversy between the Ecuadorian and Bolivian states 
and indigenous groups was the social make-up of their countries (Otero et al, p. 
518).  The Ecuadorian and Bolivian governments asserted that their nations were 
homogenous since everyone possessed an Ecuadorian or Bolivian identity (Otero 
et al, p. 518).  Other identities (such as indigenous, ethnic identities) were viewed 
as aberrations of the traditional belief of the state (Otero et al, p. 518).  Since the 
state believed alternate identities spurred disunity among its citizens, they were 
disregarded (Otero et al, p. 518). 
 A main demand of the indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia, 
however, was for their states to recognize their nations as plurinational, 
multicultural societies (Otero et al, p. 517).  To their indigenous peoples, the 
Ecuadorian and Bolivian nations were rich with different traditions and 
diversified cultures.  Since the state ignored the actual make-up of their societies, 
however, indigenous peoples asserted that only through state recognition of its 
plurinationality could the stigmatization of indigenous peoples in Bolivia and 
Ecuador begin to be addressed (Otero et al, p. 518). 
 As a result, the constitutional reforms in Bolivia and Ecuador are 
significant since the state changed an entrenched perspective.  Since the Bolivian 
and Ecuadorian states recognized that their societies were plurinational and 
multicultural in their constitutions, they simultaneously legitimized the traditions 
and recognized the demands of their indigenous peoples.  Subsequently, their 
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indigenous movements were bolstered by constitutional reform at the national 
level since the Ecuadorian and Bolivian states were incorporating the demands of 
their indigenous peoples into the political process.  Constitutional reform also 
strengthened the Bolivian and Ecuadorian indigenous movements at the 
grassroots level.  In particular, Bolivia’s 1994 constitutional reforms fortified 
ayllus and ethnic authorities (Andolina et al, p. 688). 
 Finally, the incorporation of various indigenous institutions into the 
government systems of Ecuador and Bolivia also initially strengthened their 
indigenous movements.  For example, the Bolivian state created the National 
Agrarian Reform Institute in charge of granting community land titles (Andolina 
et al, p. 694).  Although it invalidated meso-level land proposals (such as markas 
and suyus) as excessive, it validated micro-level highland land claims as ayllus 
(Andolina et al, p. 694).
6
  As a result, ayllu federation leaders aimed to restructure 
government through multiculturalism in order to make it conducive to ayllu 
cultures while the state incorporated indigenous institutions (Andolina et al, p. 
694).  Ultimately, the incorporation of indigenous organizations into the 
Ecuadorian and Bolivian states initially bolstered their indigenous movements at 
the national level since indigenous groups had an outlet to make their demands 
directly heard by the government.  As will be explained in Chapter III, however, 
                                                 
6
 Ayllus are “Andean indigenous communities of extended families, cargo-based leadership 
patterns, and occupation of specific territorial spaces.”  In a cargo-based leadership system, 
“community leaders are expected to begin in lower offices to gain experience and recognition, and 
proceed gradually stepwise to positions of greater prestige and responsibility” (Andolina et al, p. 
679). 
A marka “is a local but multi-ayllu space [that is] sometimes incorporated into the broader cultural 
space of a suyu,” which “refers to a highland region of Bolivia [that was] once a key region of the 
Incan [Empire]” (Andolina et al, p. 683). 
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clientelist incorporation can also have negative effects for indigenous movements 
in the long-run. 
The Importance of Leadership 
 Leadership at the national and local levels, in particular, impacted the 
success of indigenous movements in both Ecuador and Bolivia.  In Bolivia, 
leadership is paramount in ayllus.  According to Robert Andolina, Sarah 
Radcliffe, and Nina Laurie, ayllu leaders enact distinct identities through 
leadership to promote authorities though a cargo system; to maintain ayllu and 
marka boundaries and landmarks; and to direct community works and ceremonies 
(Andolina et al, p. 696).  Due to their promotion of identities through leadership, 
ayllu leaders play a pivotal role in promoting dialogue and indigenous identity as 
indigenous representatives at the international and national levels (Andolina et al, 
p. 696).  In particular, leadership has built solidarity in CONOMAQ for 
indigenous leaders have shared their experiences related to community justice, 
land conflicts, environmental protection, and indigenous rights legislation across 
networks (Andolina et al, p. 692). 
 The importance of leadership in Ecuador can be exemplified by two 
examples—Jumandi and Luis Macas.  Jumandi was an Amazonian hero killed by 
Spanish conquistadors in 1574 (Sawyer, p. 3).  Although almost 500 years have 
passed, Jumandi is still remembered for leading the first successful lowland 
indigenous rebellion (Sawyer, p. 3).  For example, he was an inspiration to a 
protest led by OPIP, CONFENAIE, and CONAIE during the Borja 
administration, which influenced the Ecuadorian state to grant indigenous title to 
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over one million hectares of land (Sawyer, p. 3).  As a result, symbolic leaders 
were important sources of inspiration for the Ecuadorian indigenous movement. 
Second, Luis Macas, a prominent leader of CONAIE (which is a “large 
umbrella organization that includes Andean Indian peasant groups, groups of 
urban and rural artisans, and Amazonian merchants and hunter-gatherers”) 
exemplifies a different meaning of leadership (Otero et al, p. 514).  During his 
leadership of CONAIE, he played a pivotal role in the Popular Assembly, a 
“group of civil society organizations that met to compose a new constitution for 
Ecuador” (Otero et al, p. 514).  Under his leadership, CONAIE demanded that the 
Ecuadorian government pass its constitutional reforms, which it eventually 
adopted in 1998 (Otero et al, p. 514).  As a result, Macas’ leadership served a 
different purpose for Ecuador’s indigenous movement—as a facilitator of 
indigenous demands.  As two leaders of Ecuador’s ongoing indigenous movement 
demonstrate, leaders serve two purposes—one, as symbols of past success and 
inspiration; and, two, as facilitators of indigenous demands. 
The Impact of Bi-Cultural Education 
 In 1987, a bilingual school (Quichua—Spanish) was inaugurated in 
Causaimanta Yachana, Ecuador (Perreault, p. 77).  The new bilingual school 
aimed to promote community development and organization; to teach Quichua 
language and culture; and to incorporate traditional agriculture and medicinal 
plants (Perreault, p. 78).  According to Thomas Perreault, “inter-cultural-bilingual 
schools have become a source of education and cultural revalorization” (Perreault, 
p. 78).  Ultimately, they have strengthened communal political institutions as well 
Brigham 38 
as become a source for national, indigenous political movements (Perreault, p. 
78).  As a result, bicultural education has facilitated the evolution of indigenous 
movements at the national level, especially in the case of Ecuador. 
Political Parties and the Influence of the Left 
 According to Donna Van Cott, ethnic parties were able to form in Bolivia 
and Ecuador as a result of their open institutional environments.  She claims that 
three important changes need to take place within government in order for ethnic 
parties to become viable.  First, the government needs to decentralize.  Second, 
the state needs to improve access to the ballot for aspiring political parties.  
Finally, the legislature should reserve seats for ethnic minorities (Van Cott, p. 8). 
Van Cott notes that due to Ecuador’s and Bolivia’s transitions to 
democracy during the 1990s, space opened for existing organizations to act and 
for new organizations to form (Van Cott, p. 10).  Especially after indigenous 
movements in Ecuador and Bolivia influenced the passage of constitutional 
reforms, indigenous peoples had an impetus to become involved in politics in the 
form of ethnic parties in order to ensure their new constitutional rights would be 
protected (Van Cott, p. 11).
7
  Similarly, the decline of the Left in Ecuador and 
Bolivia during the 1990s allowed these ethnic parties to form (Van Cott, p. 8). 
 Today, the Left is supported by indigenous political parties in Ecuador and 
Bolivia that grew out of strong social movements during the 1990s (Cleary, p. 
38).  Since the Left promotes egalitarian ideals, protection of the working class, 
                                                 
7
 Van Cott believes indigenous movements desire to form political parties in order to reinforce 
their traditional culture and authority via a link between culture and state (Van Cott, p. 4).  
Ultimately, she believes that political parties are the “primary link between state and society in 
modern democracies” (Van Cott, p. 1). 
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and communitarian values similar to indigenous traditions, indígenas have 
increasingly voted for political parties to the Left of the political spectrum 
(Cleary, p. 36-38).  For example, Bolivia’s first-elected indigenous president, Evo 
Morales, (who is still currently in power) ran under a socialist platform (Stiglitz, 
p. 1).  Similarly, Lucio Gutiérrez received support from indigenous enclaves and 
leftist groups during the 2003 elections in Ecuador (Cleary, p. 39).  As a result, 
political parties to the Left have provided a mode for indigenous leaders to run for 
office as well as a method for indigenous groups to represent their needs.  Since 
indígenas had another outlet for their demands via the Left, their mobilization 
efforts were bolstered. 
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Chapter III—Bolivian and Ecuadorian Indígenas: Analysis of Differences 
between Movements 
 
 Although both the Bolivian and Ecuadorian indigenous movements were 
successful due to similar factors, there are some notable differences between the 
progressions of their movements.  First, Ecuador’s indigenous movement served 
as a model for Bolivia’s indigenous movement (Andolina et al, p. 692).  Second, 
Ecuador’s indigenous movement has peaked while Bolivia’s indigenous 
movement is still growing.  Finally, the main strengths of each indigenous 
movement in Bolivia and Ecuador are different, which have affected their 
movements respectively. 
 
The Ecuadorian Indigenous Movement: A Model for All 
 One difference between Ecuador’s indigenous movement and Bolivia’s 
indigenous movement is that the indigenous movement in Ecuador was a model 
for Bolivia while Ecuador’s indigenous movement did not have a model to 
emulate.  For example, CONOMAQ and the Bolivian Lowland Indian 
Confederation both tried to mimic Ecuador’s indigenous organization CONAIE 
by establishing a national confederation (Andolina et al, p. 692).  Similar to the 
demands of CONAIE, CONOMAQ and the Bolivian Lowland Indian 
Confederation wanted state recognition of the causal roots of indigenous 
problems—colonialism, state neglect, and oligarchic domination (Andolina et al, 
p. 692).  Similarly, CONOMAQ and the Bolivian Lowland Indian Confederation 
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demanded territorial rights as the basis of its economic development to export 
ayllu value-added products; to facilitate ecologically-sound agriculture; and to 
establish culturally-appropriate education (Andolina et al, p. 695).  Finally, 
CONOMAQ and the Bolivian Lowland Indian Confederation (like CONAIE) 
pressed for the cessation of import-substitution policies (Andolina et al, p. 695). 
 In addition to the desire of CONOMAQ and the Bolivian Lowland Indian 
Confederation to emulate CONAIE, transnational actors promoted the 
confederation of CONAIE as a model for Bolivia’s indigenous movement 
(Andolina et al, p. 692).   For example, Oxfam America and the Interagency 
Border Inspection System (IBIS) sponsored dialogue between ayllu movement 
leaders and Ecuadorian indigenous leaders to help indigenous Bolivians during 
their mobilization (Andolina et al, p. 692).  Due to the actions of Oxfam America 
and IBIS, ayllu council leaders from Bolivia became international representatives 
of Bolivia’s indigenous movement, which strengthened its cause (Andolina et al, 
p. 692). 
 Furthermore, participants in Bolivia’s indigenous movement aimed to 
replicate Ecuador’s Indigenous Development Project with the help of 
transnational actors and European states (Andolina et al, p. 694-695).  For 
instance, Denmark funded Bolivia’s 1996 agrarian reform law to facilitate 
original community land titling as well as Bolivia’s 1995 Popular Participation 
Law to strengthen local municipalities (Andolina et al, p. 694).  The World Bank 
also sponsored “Innovation and Learning,” an indigenous development program 
implemented by the Bolivian Indigenous Ministry; while transnational actors 
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funded the Latin American Indigenous Development Fund, a project headed by 
indigenous leaders that provided resources for documenting indigenous ethno-
development experiences in Bolivia (Andolina et al, p. 694-695). 
Explanation of the Peaks of the Bolivian and Ecuadorian Indigenous Movements 
 Since Ecuador’s indigenous movement was promoted by transnational 
actors and imitated by local indigenous leaders in Bolivia, the indigenous 
movement in Bolivia was able to adopt its strengths while improving its 
weaknesses (such as clientelist incorporation).  Due to different sources of support 
that the indigenous movements of Ecuador and Bolivia received, the peaks of 
each indigenous movement are dissimilar.  Unlike Bolivia, Ecuador’s indigenous 
movement peaked in the early-2000s after the coup d’état that installed Gutiérrez 
as the chief executive of Ecuador.  On the other hand, Bolivia’s indigenous 
movement is still ongoing. 
Part of the explanation for this phenomenon is the individual strengths of 
each movement.  Ecuador’s indigenous movement derived its strength from a 
single indigenous organization—CONAIE—that operated at the national level 
(Andolina et al, p. 692).  Bolivia’s indigenous movement, on the other hand, was 
strong due to the base of its movement—ayllus (Yashar, p. 59). 
According to Andolina, Radcliffe, and Laurie, ayllus are “Andean 
indigenous communities [in Bolivia] of extended families, cargo-based leadership 
patterns, and occupation of specific territorial spaces” located primarily in La Paz, 
Oruro, and Potosí (Andolina et al, p. 679).  Although they are highly democratic, 
their democracies are limited due to communal assembly (in which all community 
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members must approve major decisions) as well as class, generational, and gender 
factors (Andolina et al, p. 684).  For instance, only married land owners who 
inherited territory from pre-Hispanic times are considered full ayllu citizens who 
can be selected to run for top political offices within and outside ayllus (Andolina 
et al, p. 684).  Nevertheless, ayllus have been invaluable to the indigenous 
movement of Bolivia since they provide a sense of collective identity and 
spirituality among members, political autonomy, and economic security via land 
rights, reciprocal change, and collaborative labor (Andolina et al, p. 684).  In 
particular, ayllus are becoming increasingly visible internationally, which envelop 
them in a “complex, transnational network that challenges representativeness and 
development potential of contemporary indigenous movements based on 
authenticity and success” (Andolina et al, p. 679). 
Historically, the ayllu movement in Bolivia emerged from a peasant 
movement (Andolina et al, p. 682).  After the 1952 Revolution, the Bolivian 
government universalized the voting franchise, carried out agrarian reform to 
create a class of small producers, and organized indigenous peoples into 
corporatist-union structures as “peasants” (Andolina et al, p. 682).  In most cases, 
however, “individual land titles and local union structures merged [to construct] 
communal forms of economic and political administration;” which, thereby, 
created an open-space for the celebration of indigenous ethnicity (Andolina et al, 
p. 683). 
Because the government controlled union organization during the 1980s, 
indígenas created the Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers (CSUTCB) in 
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1979 to circumvent government permission (Andolina et al, p. 683).  
Subsequently, Kataristas—an ideological conclave—collaborated with CSUTCB 
to forge an anti-colonial ideology around the colonial rebel Tupaj Katari as well 
as to tie ethnic-cultural concerns to class-based peasant identities (Andolina et al, 
p. 683).  Although CSUTCB defined highland indigenous ethnicity as only a 
“generic cultural…heritage” based on language-use (primarily Aymara or 
Quechua), CSUTCB set the stage for indigenous mobilization during the late-
1970s and throughout the 1980s (Andolina et al, p. 683). 
Similarly, despite the fall-out of ayllus due to political party intervention, 
indigenous migration, and territorial advocacy, CSUTCB gained grassroots 
support to combat the Bolivian state; to access agricultural benefits; and to 
promote bilingual education during the 1980s (Andolina et al, p. 685).  Another 
authentic, successful indigenous organization in Bolivia is the National Council of 
Ayllus and Markas of Bolivia (CONAMAQ) (Andolina et al, p. 691).  Established 
in March 1997, CONAMAQ signified the culmination of a multi-year process of 
ayllu movement activists that persuaded highland indigenous communities to 
reconstruct and create ayllus (Andolina et al, p. 691).
8
  Still in existence today, 
CONAMAQ has remade ethnic identities at various scales by rendering visible 
the names of community-level ayllus and by recovering identity categories (such 
the Qhurquii (a marka) and Karankas (a suyu) peoples) (Andolina et al, p. 698). 
In other words, ayllus derive their primary strength from grassroots 
participation at the community-level (which is authentically indigenous).  
                                                 
8
 A marka is a “local ayllu space that is sometimes incorporated into a broader cultural space” 
(Andolina et al, p. 691). 
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CONAIE, on the other hand, is a national organization that operates at the 
national level; and not only represents indigenous Ecuadorians, but Afro-
Ecuadorians as well.  Perhaps Bolivia’s indigenous movement is still ongoing due 
to its strong grassroots network of ayllus that enabled the democratic election of 
its first indigenous president—Evo Morales—in 2006. 
On the other hand, perhaps Ecuador’s indigenous movement has peaked 
due to clietelism under the Gutiérrez regime.  According to José Almeida 
Vinueza, Gutiérrez’s ascension to power had a negative impact on the indigenous 
movement (Almeida Vinueza, p. 94).  Although he claimed to be neutral, he 
followed neoliberal policies to balance the Ecuadorian government’s finances 
(Almeida Vinueza, p. 100).  Similarly, he collaborated with the Inter-Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and U.S. embassy—two organizations that indigenous groups wanted 
to avoid (Almeida Vinueza, p. 100). 
To compensate indigenous groups for their support, he made indigenous 
leaders heads of social institutions, such as the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
Ministry of Foreign Relations (Almeida Vinueza, p. 100).  Nevertheless, due to 
his association with the IMF and the U.S. embassy, the alliance between Gutiérrez 
and indigenous organizations dissolved (Almeida Vinueza, p. 100).  Without the 
support of indigenous groups, Gutiérrez aligned with right-wing parties in 
parliament (Almeida Vinueza, p. 100).  Subsequently, his collaboration with the 
economic elite and incorporation of indigenous leaders into the state undermined 
the indigenous movement by fomenting internal divisions (Almeida Vinueza, p. 
104-105).  As Almeida Vinueza claims, clientelistic representation bred dispute 
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among indigenous leaders since, naturally, certain departments of state (such as 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Foreign Relations) each have different 
needs and objectives.  Without progress, the Ecuadorian indigenous movement 
became wary of national politics; and risks remaining isolated (Almeida Vinueza, 
p. 105). 
Almeida Vinueza also suggests that Gutiérrez’s embrace of a neoliberal 
model of development dismantled grassroots communities as well as inhibited the 
development of human capital for it did not address the basic needs of its 
population (Almeida Vinueza, p. 106).  Rather, it focused on the economic 
progression of the state (Almeida Vinueza, p. 106).  Therefore, the dissociation of 
the state from indigenous organizations’ demands after 2003 and the weakening 
of connections between indigenous organizations due to clientelistic incorporation 
have caused the indigenous movement in Ecuador to wane. 
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Chapter IV—Peru: the Indigenous Anomaly 
 
 Compared to Ecuador and Bolivia, indigenous organization in Peru is a 
perplexing anomaly.  Interestingly, several indigenous summits have taken place 
in Peru.  For example, Lima hosted the reconvention of the Amazon Basin Treaty 
sponsored by the Inter-American Indigenist Institute of the Organization of 
American States (OAS) in 1982 and again in 1984 (which resulted in the creation 
of the Coordinating Body for the Indigenous Peoples’ Organizations of the 
Amazon Basin (COICA), a transnational indigenous organization that links 
together indigenous peoples’ of Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, 
Surinam, Guyana and Peru) (Mato, p. 352).  Similarly, the first Amazonian 
Summit of Indigenous Peoples’ and Environmentalist Organizations took place in 
Inquitos, Peru in May 1990 (Mato, p. 352). 
Nevertheless, although around 40 percent of Peru’s population consists of 
indígenas—an indigenous population higher than Ecuador—its indigenous 
movement has been stagnant (Yashar, p. 19).  Why did successful, national 
indigenous movements arise in Ecuador and Bolivia, but not in Peru?  This is the 
question that I will answer in this chapter. 
 
Peru—a Deceivingly Similar History 
 Like Ecuador and Bolivia, Peru experienced a similar colonial history and 
indigenous stigmatization.  As a result, race relations succumb to the same 
hierarchy as in Ecuador and Bolivia where wealth and superiority are associated 
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with whiteness; and where poverty, simple-mindedness, and inferiority are 
paralleled with indigeneity or blackness (Otero, p. 330).  Similarly, all three 
societies practiced a hacienda system comprised of a white patrón and indigenous 
or black campesinos.  The hacienda system in all three societies was also 
challenged by workers’ rights, the organization of unions, and the rise of a labor 
(or peasant) movement; and eradicated by agrarian reforms.  Therefore, in theory, 
Peru’s indigenous movement should have evolved from its labor movement as 
happened in Ecuador and Bolivia. 
Is it Peru’s Geography? 
 In practice, however, Peru’s indigenous movement does not match the 
indigenous movements of both Bolivia and Ecuador.  At first glance, Peru’s 
geography appears to be the culprit of this discrepancy (see Table 1 below and 
Figure 1). 
Table 1: Indigenous Population by Region in Peru9 
Department Total 
Population 
Total Indigenous 
Population over 
Age 5 
Aggregate 
Percent of 
Indigenous 
Apurimac 404,190 289,904 71.7 
Puno 1,268,441 837,171 66.0 
Huancavelica 454,797 294,253 64.7 
Ayacucho 612,489 392,605 64.1 
Cusco 1,171,403 622,015 53.1 
Áncash 1,063,459 338,180 31.8 
Huánuco 762,223 221,807 29.1 
Moquegua 161,533 34,083 21.1 
Madre de Díos 109,555 22,240 20.3 
Tacna 288,781 57,179 19.8 
Arequipa 1,152,303 19,704 17.1 
Amazonas 375,993 53,391 14.2 
                                                 
9
 "Peru: Poblacion Censada de 5 y mas anos de edad, por lengua aprendida en la ninez segun 
departamento 2007." Chart. INEI-Censos nacionales 2007; XI de poblacion y VI de vivienda. 
Peru, 2007. 
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Junin 1,225,474 126,224 10.3 
Pasco 280,449 21,034 7.5 
Loreto 891,732 63,313 7.1 
Lima 8,445,211 557,384 6.6 
Provincial Coast of 
Callao 
876,877 45,598 5.2 
Ica 711,932 34,173 4.8 
Lambayeque 1,113,868 25,619 2.3 
San Martín 728,808 13,119 1.8 
Ucayali 432,159 35,437 8.2 
Cajamarca 1,387,809 6,939 0.5 
La Libertad 1,617,050 4,851 0.3 
Piura 1,676,315 5,029 0.3 
Tumbes 200,306 401 0.2 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica e Infórmatica (2007) 
 
Figure 1: Map of Peru10 
*Provinces with Indigenous Percentages Above 50% Highlighted 
 
When the statistics in Table 1 are applied to a topographic map, we can see that 
the majority of indígenas are located in Apurimac, Ayacucho, Cusco, 
                                                 
10
 "Peru." Map. Univeristy of Texas. http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/peru.gif. 
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Huancavelica, Puno—regions within the Andes Mountains.  Naturally, 
communities in the mountains are separated from each other; and travel between 
communities is difficult.  Logically, since communication would be hindered in a 
mountainous region, one could argue that geography hampers indigenous 
mobilization in Peru. 
 The indigenous collocation in Ecuador and Bolivia, however, resemble 
Peru’s dispersed population (see Table 2 and 3 as well as Figure 2 and 3 below). 
Table 2: Location of Indigenous Peoples in Ecuador11 
Province Total 
Population 
Total 
Indigenous 
Population 
Aggregate 
Percent of 
Indigenous 
Amazonian Region 
(Total) 
414,623 140,972 34.0 
Coastal Region 
(Total) 
4,825,000 43, 425 0.9 
El Oro 455,187 7,283 1.6 
Esmeraldas 298,000 4,172 1.4 
Guayas 2,668,727 29,356 1.1 
Los Ríos 469,200 2,346 0.5 
Manabí 933,886 268 0.0 
Sierra Region (Total) 4,394,812 492,219 11.2 
Chimborazo 308,334 114,392 37.1 
Cotopaxi 272,514 64,586 23.7 
Imbabura 277,943 63,649 22.9 
Cañar 158,528 33,925 21.4 
Bolivar 121,853 25,711 21.1 
Tungurahua 368,697 43,875 11.9 
Pichincha 1,978,896 114,776 5.8 
Loja 306,394 11,643 3.8 
Azuay 490,428 17,165 3.5 
Carchi 118,857 2,496 2.1 
TOTAL 
POPULATION 
9,529,802 676,616 7.1* 
Source: Sistema de Información Estadística Georeferenciada (2007) 
*Statistics reflect self-identification of indigenous nationality by region 
 
                                                 
11
 "Ecuador: Autodefinión étnica como indígenas." Chart. INEC-Censos nacionales 2007; XI de 
poblacion y VI de vivienda. Ecuador, 2007. 
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Figure 2: Map of Ecuador12 
*Provinces with Indigenous Percentages Above 34% Highlighted 
 
 
Table 3: Indigenous Population by Region in Bolivia13 
Department Total 
Population 
Total 
Population 
Over Age 15 
Total 
Indigenous 
People Over 
Age 15 
Aggregate 
Percent of 
Indigenous 
Potosí 709,013 414,838 347,847 83.85 
La Paz 2,350,466 1,501,970 1,163,418 77.46 
Cochabamba 1,455,711 900,020 669,261 74.36 
Oruro 391,870 250,983 185,474 73.90 
Chiquisaca 531,522 308,386 202,204 65.57 
Santa Cruz 2,029,471 1,216,658 456,102 37.49 
Bení 362,521 202,169 66,217 32.75 
                                                 
12
 "Ecuador." Map. Univeristy of Texas. 
<http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/ecuador_rel91.jpg>. 
13
 Van Cott, p. 51. 
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Tarija 391,226 239,550 47,175 19.69 
Pando 52,525 30,418 4,939 16.24 
TOTAL 
POPULATION 
8,274,325 5,064,992 3,142,637 62.05 
Source: Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda (2001) (Van Cott, p. 51) 
 
Figure 3: Map of Bolivia14 
*Provinces with Indigenous Percentage Above 65% highlighted 
 
As in the case of Peru, when the statistics of Table 2 and 3 are applied to 
topographic maps of Ecuador and Bolivia, we can see that the majority of 
indígenas in both countries are located in the Andes Mountains (around the 
Amazonian region and Chimborazo in Ecuador; around Chiquisaca, Cochabamba, 
La Paz, Oruro, and Potosí in Bolivia).  In theory, Ecuador’s geography should 
have disadvantaged indigenous mobilization more than Peru’s geography due to 
the Andes-Amazon split.  Cross-nationally, the majority of indígenas located in 
the South American region follow the line of the Andes Mountains.  Therefore, 
logically, the geographic location of indigenous peoples in Peru does not explain 
                                                 
14
 “Bolivia.” Map. Mapquest. <http://go.hrw.com/atlas/norm_map/bolivia.gif>. 
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why Peru failed to develop indigenous movements to the extent that Ecuador and 
Bolivia did since all three countries have similar concentrations of indigenous 
peoples. 
 Furthermore, the reason for the Peruvian case is not a challenge of 
multicultural integration (Otero et al, p. 518).  According to Gerardo Otero, 
multicultural integration is a challenge for emerging Latin American democracies 
due to the ideology of the ruling class (Otero et al, p. 518).  During the nineteenth 
century, Latin American elites adopted the view that their nations were culturally-
homogenous for it coincided with their capitalist-development models to 
assimilate indigenous peoples (Otero et al, p. 518).  The ideology of the ruling 
class, however, was overcome in Ecuador and Bolivia through their indigenous 
movements’ persistent demands for constitutional reforms (Otero et al, p. 518).  
Although the view of the elite, ruling class may be hegemonically powerful in 
Latin America, their ideology is permeable.  Therefore, the challenge of 
multicultural integration may be problematic in the Peruvian case, but it does not 
explain why its indigenous movement was weaker than the indigenous 
movements of Bolivia and Ecuador. 
 The Anomaly Unravels… 
 To help explain Peru’s case, political scientists have offered several 
explanations.  According to Alison Brysk and Carolyn Wise, indigenous peoples 
were unable to organize due to uncontrolled guerilla activity in the countryside 
(Brysk et al, p. 91).  As explained in Chapter I, Sendero Luminoso, a leftist 
organization headed by Abimael Guzmán who was inspired by Mao Zedong’s 
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Cultural Revolution, terrorized the Peruvian countryside and Andean highlands to 
coerce its inhabitants (mainly indígenas) to join its cause (Brysk et al, p. 92).  
Since the Peruvian government was unable to control Sendero Luminoso’s 
guerilla activity, Brysk and Wise assert indigenous mobilization was impeded. 
 Brysk and Wise further explain that Peruvian indígenas did not develop an 
ethnic identity because Sendero Luminoso spurred and exacerbated certain factors 
that could have facilitated indígenas to mobilize.  For instance, Brysk and Wise 
assert that Sendero Luminoso exacerbated the geographic isolation of Indian 
communities in the highlands and Amazon.  Sendero Luminoso also stirred high 
migration in Peru by citizens who wished to escape Sendero Luminoso’s sphere of 
influence.  Finally, the inherent racism of Peruvians against its indigenous peoples 
as well as the presence of the urban Left further inhibited indigenous 
organization.  As a result, Brysk and Wise explain that indigenous peoples in Peru 
continued to identify themselves on a class-basis.  In other words, without an 
ethnic identity, indígenas’ impetus to mobilize was nonexistent (Brysk et al, p. 
91). 
 Although Brysk and Wise identified a cause that inhibited indigenous 
mobilization (the influential terror of Sendero Luminoso), their argument is 
incomplete.  When compared to the cases of Ecuador and Bolivia, the holes of 
Brysk and Wise’s assertions are evident.  Similar to Peruvian indigenous peoples, 
the indígenas of Ecuador and Bolivia are faced with intense racism of the white 
elite, mestizo class, and their indigenous peers as well (McClintock, p. 3).  
Likewise, the indigenous communities of Ecuador and Bolivia are also isolated 
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geographically in the Andean highlands (as explained earlier).  Therefore, two 
factors that Brysk and Wise identify as contributing to Peru’s indigenous case are 
questionable since Ecuadorian and Bolivian indígenas mobilized despite the same 
circumstances. 
 One factor that Brysk and Wise identify, however, may offer a more valid 
explanation as to why Peruvian indigenous peoples did not mobilize successfully 
at a national level.  Due to Sendero Luminoso, there was high migration in the 
Peruvian countryside to escape its hegemonic influence (Brysk et al, p. 91).  
Assuming that these indigenous peoples had the money to migrate, the constant 
upheaval of indígenas may explain their inability to mobilize.  Migration may 
have also been forced by Sendero Luminoso due to its tactic to destroy 
insubordinate communities (State of Fear, 2005).  As a result, indigenous 
mobilization in Peru would have been stifled nationally since they could not meet 
across communities and regions locally.  Most likely, however, the indigenous 
peoples who lived in the Peruvian countryside would not have the funds to 
spontaneously migrate; which would entrap them in and force them to succumb to 
Sendero Luminoso’s control. 
Sendero Luminoso and the Power of Fear 
 Therefore, the main contributor to the Peruvian indigenous case is fear of 
violence from Sendero Luminoso and components of the state itself.  Although the 
presence of Sendero Luminoso may have been unfelt by urban dwellers (such as 
in Lima), Sendero Luminoso’s power was felt by residents of the countryside 
(State of Fear, 2005). 
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Sendero Luminoso, however, was not the only promulgator of rural 
violence.  On the contrary, violence was precipitated by the state as well.  To 
control Sendero Luminoso and to attempt to capture its leader Gúzman, the García 
administration declared parts of the Peruvian countryside as “emergency zones.”  
In these emergency zones, the García administration granted sole control to the 
military.  As a result, the military could use any means to capture followers of 
Sendero Luminoso.  The only problem, however, was that Sendero Luminoso had 
covertly infiltrated the Peruvian countryside by absorbing followers from all age 
groups, classes, and sexes.  For this reason, the military could not determine 
systematically who was a follower of Sendero Luminoso until a guerilla attack 
was launched; or without interrogation (State of Fear, 2005). 
Thus, the Peruvian military often terrorized the countryside, in addition to 
Sendero Luminoso, to discover its supporters.  For example, in the documentary 
film State of Fear, a former soldier described how his unit interrogated a 
suspected follower of Sendero Luminoso.  From a helicopter, they tied the suspect 
with a rope and hung him upside down as they flew through the air.  They told 
him that if he did not tell his unit where his supporters’ hide-out was located, they 
would cut the rope.  The solider, however, admitted that if the suspect had 
confessed the coordinates of his lair to his unit, they would have cut the rope 
anyway (State of Fear, 2005). 
Indigenous communities were especially targeted by military units (State 
of Fear, 2005).  Since most indigenous communities retained their traditional 
languages (often Quechua or Aymara in the case of Peru), a language barrier 
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existed between the military and indigenous peoples, which exacerbated 
miscommunication (State of Fear, 2005).  Naturally, a language barrier might be 
problematic for the captor and captive during an interrogation session.  Due to 
fear of survival from Sendero Luminoso and the military campaign in the 
countryside, indígenas’ chose to adhere to authority, rather than challenging the 
state for equal rights, in order to live. 
The Prowess of the Fujimori Regime 
 Sendero Luminoso is only part of the reasons for Peru’s case.  In 1990, 
Alberto Fujimori was democratically elected to the presidency under the platform 
of “honesty, technology, and hard work” (García Calderón, p. 47).  His Japanese 
ancestry and immigrant background appealed to the lower classes of Peru for he 
seemed like “Un presidente como tú (‘A president who looks like you’)” 
(McClintock, p. 7).  Similarly, his platform to end the violence of Sendero 
Luminoso and the economic plight of Peru gained him the support of the country 
(García Calderón, p. 48).  Under the guise of protecting Peruvians from Sendero 
Luminoso’s violence and the economy, Fujimori attained tremendous executive 
power that transformed Peru from a democratic society to an authoritarian 
government (García Calderón, p. 48). 
 For example, when Gúzman rushed his plans to attack Lima in 1992 in 
order to launch his revolution, Fujimori responded with brute force.  He staged an 
autogolpe, an act ironically supported by a majority of Peruvian citizens, in April 
1992 in order to take the necessary measures to halt Gúzman’s plot.  By 
suspending Congress, Fujimori gained absolute power to dictate his policies.  
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Although Gúzman was captured in September 1992, Fujimori still maintained his 
executive control over the Peruvian state (García Calderón, p. 48). 
 Without an outlet to justify the necessity of his authoritarian rule, 
however, Fujimori needed new targets—the Peruvian people.  As State of Fear 
documented, an indigenous woman shared her story of life under the Fujimori 
regime.  On her first day attending college, she was abducted under false charges.  
While being interrogated, she was raped repeatedly by the guards (from which she 
became pregnant).  To stop the torture, she pleaded guilty to her alleged charges 
against the Fujimori government; and had her current daughter while in prison.  
Mysterious disappearances (such as this one) were common under the Fujimori 
regime, which caused Peruvian citizens to live in a state of fear (State of Fear, 
2005). 
Similarly, any institution (such as the media) that acted against the 
message of the Fujimori administration was dismantled.  For example, when 
Contrapunto, a Sunday-morning political show, “aired an investigative report on 
female intelligence agents who were tortured by their bosses for allegedly leaking 
information about the National Intelligence Service (SIN)” and broadcasted 
Vladimir Montesinos’ 1996 earnings and tax returns, the Interior Ministry 
stripped Baruch Ivcher (the major shareholder of Frecuencia Latina, the 
television station that aired Contrapunto) of his citizenship.  Sympathizers of 
Montesinios also took control of Contapunto.  Other media either practiced self-
censorship (such as América television) or was seized (such as Red global) as well 
(García Calderón, p. 50-51). 
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The Impacts of Sendero Luminoso and the Fujimori Administration 
Naturally, other organizations that called for the reform of the state (which 
was a major demand of indigenous movements in both Ecuador and Bolivia) were 
dissolved.  Due to constant fear promulgated by Sendero Luminoso and then by 
the Fujimori administration, indigenous mobilization remained regional rather 
than growing into a national movement since it lacked factors that contributed to 
the indigenous movements of Bolivia and Ecuador (Yashar, p. 58-59).  For 
instance, Deborah Yashar claims that indigenous movements emerged due to a 
combination of three factors—changing citizenship regimes, transcommunity 
networks, and open political-associational space (Yashar, p. 29).  According to 
Yashar, Peru lacked these factors due to the civil war between Sendero Luminoso 
and the Peruvian state as well as foreclosed political-associational space (Yashar, 
p. 26). 
In the case of Ecuador, Yashar explains that indígenas had the capacity to 
form transcommunity networks via peasant unions and church networks.  
Similarly, they had the opportunity to engage in political-associational space from 
1978 onward.  As a result, Ecuador’s indigenous movement was embodied by a 
strong national confederation—CONAIE founded in 1985 by ECUARUNARI 
and CONFENAIE (Yashar, p. 58). 
In the case of Bolivia, Yashar claims that indigenous peoples could form 
transcommunity networks via peasant unions, church networks, and NGOs.  
Likewise, they had the opportunity to engage in political-associational space from 
1970 to 1971 and then again from 1978 onward.  As a result, Bolivia’s indigenous 
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movement was constructed through strong regional confederations—such as the 
Kataristas and CSUTCB as well as CIDOB (Yashar, p. 59). 
On the other hand, Peru’s only capacity for transcommunity, indigenous 
networks was via fragmented peasant unions and church networks.  Furthermore, 
Peruvian indígenas’ opportunity for political-associational space was restricted, 
especially from 1980-1992 as a result of Sendero Luminoso.  Although the end of 
the civil war in the 1990s provided greater political-associational space, it was 
still restricted as a result of the 1992 autogolpe.  Therefore, Yashar explains that 
indigenous organization in Peru only became a weak regional movement 
embodied by Asociación Inter-étnica para el Desarollo de la Selva Peruana 
(AIDESEP) (which was founded in 1980) and the Unión de Comunidades 
Aymaras (UNCA) (which was established in 1983) (Yashar, p. 59). 
Yashar’s theory further deconstructs the anomaly of Peru’s indigenous 
movement.  Due to the violence precipitated by Peru’s civil war between Sendero 
Luminoso and the government as well as by Fujimori’s authoritarian rule, 
political-associational space was restricted in Peru (Yashar, p. 26).  In other 
words, indigenous opportunities to freely associate with other supporters of their 
cause or to freely express their viewpoints from the 1980s to 2000s were impeded 
more so than under the Velasco Regime during the 1970s (Yashar, p. 54).  Due to 
a restriction of political-associational space, Peruvian society lacked the 
environment for changing citizenship regimes (or evolving indigenous 
organizations); for transcommunity networks due to fragmented peasant unions 
and church networks; and for grassroots formation as well as networking between 
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local indigenous groups (Yashar, p. 54).  Indigenous organizations also lacked 
institutional support from the Peruvian state (although not so in the cases of 
Ecuador and Bolivia) since dissenting opinions that called for government reform 
were viewed as subversive by the Fujimori regime (and, therefore, were 
prohibited) (Yashar, p. 59). 
In addition, due to fear of violence and retaliation, most NGOs avoided 
sustained involvement in the Peruvian countryside to facilitate an indigenous 
movement; and, therefore, indigenous peoples were unable to utilize the resources 
provided by transnational actors (such as transnational networking and bicultural 
education).  As explained in Chapter II and Chapter III, transnational actors 
played a huge role in the Ecuadorian and Bolivian indigenous movements to 
sustain their progress.  Therefore, the lack of transnational actor support was a 
main inhibitor of the Peruvian indigenous movement’s evolution from local to 
national action. 
The Emphasis of Class 
 A third factor that contributed to the case of Peru was indigenous 
classification by indígenas themselves (McClintock, p. 3).  According to Cynthia 
McClintock, the “political dynamics [of Peru] since 1968 as well as its geography 
and demographic trends…limit[ed] the establishment of indigenous identities [as 
evident] in recent decades” (McClintock, p. 2).  Referring to historical precedent, 
McClintock explains that the “repression of indigenous peoples was more 
concerted and more cruel than in Bolivia or Ecuador” (McClintock, p. 3).  For 
instance, she notes that while certain indigenous elites were granted privileges in 
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Ecuador and Bolivia, the Spanish conquistadors annihilated the Incan nobility in 
Peru since Cusco (a Peruvian province) was the epicenter of the Incan empire 
(McClintock, p. 3). 
 After Peru gained independence in 1824, an oligarchy ruled the state until 
the 1930s (McClintock, p. 3).  Since the oligarchy, two ethnic poles have arisen in 
Peruvian society, which coincide with class and geographic location (McClintock, 
p. 3).  According to McClintock, one ethnic pole was comprised of the oligarchy 
and white population (about 10 percent) who were “Catholic, Spanish-speaking, 
wealthy, and based in Lima” (McClintock, p. 3).  The second ethnic pole 
consisted of Indians “who were dark-skinned…nominally Catholic, Quechua-
speaking, impoverished, and based in the Andean mountains” (McClintock, p. 3). 
 Post-1968, however, the two poles in Peru began to change.  When the 
military dictator Juan Velasco Alvarado came to power in 1968, he reclassified 
indigenous communities as peasant communities.  As a result, rural communities 
(where a majority of Peruvian indigenous peoples lived) began identifying on a 
class basis rather than based on their ethnicity (McClintock, p. 3-4). 
 Ironically, Peru’s labor movement was strengthened under the Velasco 
regime.  At the beginning of his term, Velasco legally recognized 2,297 unions.  
By 1977, Velasco had legalized 4,453 unions (a 51.8% increase).  Velasco also 
passed a series of laws to help protect and to appease labor unions, such as a job 
security law in 1970.  Interestingly, Velasco also recognized a Communist-
affiliated labor union known as General Affiliation of Workers of Peru (CGTP) in 
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1971.  Soon, 44 percent of labor unions became affiliated with CGTP (Stokes, p. 
33-35). 
 In an effort to gain the support of the working class, Velasco created the 
Sistema Nacional en Apoyo de la Mobilización Social (SINAMOS) in 1971 
(Stokes, p. 37).  Since the government was unable to control Peru’s labor 
movement, however, new parties emerged to compete for poblador support 
(Stokes, p. 37).  Subsequently, the Marxist Left was strengthened as the 
government allowed unionization to surge (Stokes, p. 45).  In response to the 
decline of real salaries and wages (which increased poverty among the lower 
classes) as a result of a hemispheric-wide debt crisis in 1975, Sendero Luminoso 
began its rise to power (Stokes, p. 49-51). 
The emphasis of class was also reinforced by the ideology of Sendero 
Luminoso throughout the 1980s (McClintock, p. 4).  As McClintock explains, 
during the 1980s, Peru was believed to have “the strongest Marxist left of any 
country in South America” (McClintock, p. 4).  Therefore, as under the Velasco 
regime, indigenous communities adopted class (rather than ethnic) identities that 
the Left emphasized during the 1980s.  Without an emphasis on ethnicity, 
indigenous mobilization suffered in Peru. 
As I explain in the conclusion section, Peru has been taking steps to 
recognize the atrocities that occurred under the Fujimori regime and Sendero 
Luminoso.  The outlook for Peru’s future is hopeful, but the fear that the Fujimori 
regime, military, and Sendero Luminoso caused still impacts democracy in Peru 
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today.  Unlike the late 1970s to 2000, however, indígenas have more political-
associational space to voice their demands to the government in Peru today. 
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Conclusion 
 
 As has been explored in Chapter IV, Peru’s violent history and identity 
politics hampered indigenous mobilization.  Peru’s indigenous case is not result of 
geographic hindrances since high concentrations of indigenous peoples are 
located along the Andes Mountains as in Ecuador and Bolivia.  Nor is it an 
example of elite oppression since indígenas in both Ecuador and Bolivia 
experienced white and mestizo prejudice as did indigenous peoples in Peru. 
Rather, the violence caused by Sendero Luminoso, the Peruvian military, 
and the Fujimori regime inhibited indigenous mobilization in Peru because 
indígenas did not have the same resources available to indigenous peoples in 
Ecuador and Bolivia.  As explained in Chapters II and III, transnational actors 
facilitated indigenous organization in Bolivia and Ecuador since they sponsored 
and inspired indigenous peoples to mobilize.  The Bolivian and Ecuadorian states 
also passed several initiatives, such as constitutional reforms to recognize their 
societies as plurinational and land titles pushed by indigenous organizations.  
Leadership and the emergence of indigenous political parties also strengthened 
indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador.  Finally, bilingual schools in 
Bolivia and Ecuador helped educate indígenas as well as valorize their culture.  
On the other hand, Peruvian indigenous peoples, who were terrorized by Sendero 
Luminoso and by the backlash of the Peruvian military and Fujimori regime, 
focused on surviving instead of demanding equal rights from the state. 
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An Outlook for the Future 
 With the capture and sentencing of Fujimori and the reinstallation of a 
separation of powers system, Peru’s current political and social environment is 
different for its indigenous peoples today.
15
  Especially since the founding of its 
Truth Commission, Peru has been recognizing the atrocities that occurred under 
the Fujimori administration (McClintock, p. 4).  For example, the Truth 
Commission has found that at least 75 percent of people who were murdered 
during the reign of Sendero Luminoso were indigenous, rural, Quechua-speaking 
people (McClintock, p. 4).  In other words, Peruvian indígenas were the most 
affected by the violence of Sendero Luminoso and the military. 
 Former president Alejandro Toledo, the successor of Alberto Fujimori, 
also recognized the 5000-page report compiled by the Truth Commission in 2003 
(State of Fear, 2005).  With the founding of an institution that is documenting the 
atrocities of Peru’s past and monitoring the progression of Peru’s political reform 
as well as the state’s recognition of the Truth Commission’s efforts, Peruvian 
citizens have more political-associational space in which they can rally freely.  As 
a result, Peruvian indigenous peoples have more opportunities to mobilize 
currently than they did 30 years ago when the Ecuadorian and Bolivian 
indigenous movements were launching and evolving at the national level. 
 Developments at the grassroots level also suggest that Peruvian indígenas 
may be mobilizing more successfully now than in the past.  According to María 
                                                 
15
 Fujimori was captured in Chile and extradited to Peru on human rights charges in 2005.   In 
April 2009, he was sentenced to 25 years in imprison by the Peruvian Supreme Court for his 
offenses during his authoritarian rule in the 1990s (Moffet, Fujimori Sentenced for Peru Killings; 
Wall Street Journal: April 8, 2009). 
Brigham 67 
Elena García, bicultural education in the highlands is being pushed by 
intercultural activists as well as by the Peruvian Ministry of Education in Lima 
(Elena García, p. 71).  Although some Quechua-speaking, indigenous parents 
reject bilingual education (since Spanish is valued higher as a means to rise in 
class), bicultural education has been succeeding in the indigenous highlands 
(Elena García, p. 72).  For example, through the efforts of NGOs to promote adult 
literacy, literacy groups for women have emerged in Peru (Elena García, p. 82).  
As Peruvian indigenous women explain, if they can learn skills (such as the 
ability to read and write their own language as well as Spanish), they will be able 
to teach their children (Elena García, p. 81).  Similarly, Peruvian indigenous 
women in the highlands feel that learning Spanish will help protect their children 
from marginalization (Elena García, p. 81). 
 Furthermore, Elena García notes that a Peruvian, indigenous intellectual 
elite is emerging in the countryside (Elena García, p. 85).  As bicultural education 
progresses, selected indigenous youths, aided by NGOs, are attending masters 
programs in five Andean countries (Elena García, p. 85).   The first class of 
Quechua intellectuals graduated in 2001 with masters degrees in education and 
linguistics (Elena García, p. 88).  Subsequently, their ability to read, write, and 
speak Quechua has enabled them to gain a higher status in their communities and 
Peruvian society (Elena García, p. 88).  Likewise, their intellectual status has 
attracted NGOs to adopt them as indigenous representatives of their cultures 
(Elena García, p. 88).  Not surprisingly, the progression of indigenous youth in 
Peru mirrors the beginnings of indigenous movements in both Ecuador and 
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Bolivia.  Therefore, Peruvian indigenous peoples have the potential to mobilize at 
the national level if they so choose.  As García claims, a “more intercultural 
education system will better empower and equip indigenous people to demand 
equal rights as citizens”—the ultimate demand of any indigenous movement 
(Elena García, p. 71). 
 In addition, indigenous peoples politically have become more self-
determined at the local level.  For example, Carlos Ivan Degregori notes that the 
number of mayors who can speak Quechua has increased in the Peruvian 
highlands since the mid-2000s (McClintock, p. 14).  Elena García also 
emphasizes that indigenous community leaders have been pushing for schools 
controlled by the indigenous community (Elena García, p. 82).  As a result, 
indigenous peoples are becoming more politically active, which may translate to 
the national level. 
 Of course, there are some complications for indigenous mobilization in 
Peru.  First, Peru is currently considered a democracy in transition.  Since 
Fujimori dissolved Congress and the judiciary with his autogolpe in 1992, Peru 
has had to revamp its democratic system of government.  Although Fujimori 
reinstated a pseudo-Congress in the late-1990s, it remained a puppet of the 
executive branch of government.  With the exile of Fujimori in the early-2000s 
and efforts of Alejandro Toledo, Peru has taken the opportunity to proceed with 
democratic reforms.  Ideally, the push of the Peruvian government to institute 
reform would seem conducive for the mobilization of indigenous peoples.  In 
practice, however, Peru’s transition most likely means its government will be 
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focused on internal reforms rather than on the concerns of its indigenous peoples 
(State of Fear, 2005). 
 A second complication is the classification of Peru’s presidential 
candidates since the early-2000s.  Technically, Alejandro Toledo is considered 
Peru’s first indigenous president for he was “born into poverty in a rural mountain 
community of northern Peru” and “his physical features are…conventionally 
considered indigenous” by Peruvian standards (McClintock, p. 8).  Although he 
does not speak Quechua, Peruvian citizens consider Toledo a cholo, or “an 
‘Indian’ who has adopted non-indigenous attire, language, and customs…[to] 
ascend…the socioeconomic ladder” (McClintock, p. 8).  On the other hand, 
Bolivia’s indigenous movement existed at the national level before the election of 
its first indigenous president, Evo Morales.  Similarly, Ecuador’s indigenous 
movement existed at the national level before the coup of 2000 to overthrow the 
president in power. 
Toledo, however, was elected without the presence of a Peruvian 
indigenous movement at the national level.  His election is not indicative of ethnic 
advancement in Peru since his ethnic background was coincidental to his position.  
Therefore, his identification as the first indigenous president may be problematic 
for the indigenous movement since his election was not based on a platform to 
honor indigenous demands.  Rather, his indigenous physical features are 
coincidental to his former political position.  Nevertheless, his classification and 
election may confound some indigenous demands (such as to be represented 
equally in Peru’s political process) because according to the Peruvian elite and to 
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some countries of the international community, Alejandro Toledo was Peru’s first 
“indigenous” president (McClintock, p. 8). 
Finally, a third complication that may impede indigenous mobilization is 
political indifference.  According to Ernesto García Calederón, most Peruvians 
“[do not] care…whether they live in a democracy…as long as their lifestyles were 
not threatened” (García Calderón, p. 53).  Although Peruvian citizens protested 
Fujimori’s attempt to disregard the constitution and to run for a third presidential 
term, political indifference may still persist among indigenous peoples in the 
Peruvian countryside if their current lifestyle is not affected by Peru’s democratic 
transition. 
Due to the upheaval caused by Sendero Luminoso and the Fujimori 
administration that did disrupt indigenous lifestyles, however, indigenous peoples 
may be more apt to take action under a political system that is currently valuing 
democratic forms of government (García Calderón, p. 53).  Despite Peru’s violent 
past, indígenas have more political-associational space to speak freely of their 
atrocities via the Truth Commission.  Subsequently, the actions of the Truth 
Commission may inspire indigenous peoples to speak freely of ways to prevent 
future atrocities against their communities from happening.  How can indigenous 
peoples prevent Peru’s violent past from repeating?  Obviously, one method (as 
taken by indígenas in Ecuador and Bolivia) may be through indigenous 
mobilization, organization, and demand of equal rights at the national level. 
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Written Capstone Summary 
 
Project Description and Significance 
 For my Capstone Project, I compared and contrasted indigenous 
movements in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru.  In my preliminary research of Latin 
American indigenous movements, I noted that Ecuador and Bolivia have had the 
most successful indigenous movements at the national level in the region while 
Peru’s indigenous groups have lagged behind the mobilization fervor.  Although 
Peru has a large indigenous population, even higher than the proportion of 
indigenous groups in Ecuador, its indigenous movement has not transpired passed 
the local level.  This discrepancy in indigenous mobilization across Latin America 
was intriguing. 
Therefore, I formulated my thesis around discovering the causes for the 
Peruvian case versus the Bolivian and Ecuadorian cases.  The contributing causes 
to the Peruvian case were the state of fear caused by Sendero Luminoso, the 
military, and the Fujimori administration as well as indigenous classification by 
Peruvian indígenas themselves.  The state of fear caused by Sendero Luminoso, 
the military, and the Fujimori administration discouraged transnational actors and 
the state to aid Peruvian indigenous groups, which were available to indigenous 
groups who mobilized in both Bolivia and Ecuador.  The current political climate 
in Peru, however, may help sustain an indigenous movement at the national level 
in the future. 
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My Capstone Project is significant for it will show the causes of and 
inhibitors to successful indigenous mobilization in Latin America.  It will also 
demonstrate how an authoritarian regime confounds facets of democratic 
participation, mainly social movement in the case of this thesis.  This Capstone 
Project will also offer predictions about whether a future indigenous movement at 
the national movement will arise in Peru. 
 
Methods of Research 
 To write my Capstone Project, I consulted several texts to compare 
theories about what made indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador 
successful nationally and about why Peru lacked an indigenous movement.  On 
the basis of the theories I researched as well as lessons learned from prior courses, 
I drew conclusions that I applied in my thesis. 
 
Project Summary 
In the late-twentieth century, indigenous peoples in both Ecuador and 
Bolivia organized successfully at a national level.  Eventually, indigenous 
mobilization achieved more political representation for indigenous groups in the 
legislative and executive branches of government (Yashar, p. 19).  Peru’s 
indigenous movement, however, has lagged far behind the indigenous movements 
of its two neighbors.  Although 38 to 40 percent of Peru’s population is 
indigenous (versus 60 to 70 percent of Bolivia’s population and only 30 to 38 
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percent of Ecuador’s population), Peru’s indigenous peoples have barely 
organized at a local level (Yashar, p. 19). 
For these reasons, it is evident that strength in numbers is not the only 
precursor to indigenous mobilization at the national level.  There must be 
mitigating factors behind the indigenous movements in Ecuador, Bolivia, and 
Peru that would cause different outcomes in these countries.  For example, Peru’s 
indigenous diversification may be a contributing factor.  In other words, language 
barriers and cultural differences impede Peruvian indigenous peoples’ abilities to 
compromise on issues, to collaborate, and to organize at a national level. 
When comparing Ecuador and Bolivia’s indigenous movements, the 
reasons for the Peruvian indigenous movement’s complications are more obvious.  
For instance, the efforts of transnational actors at the international level, the 
involvement of the state at the national level as well as the influence of leaders 
and impact of bicultural education at the local level evolved the Ecuadorian and 
Bolivian indigenous movements to their pinnacles today. 
First, transnational actors provided the Ecuadorian and Bolivian 
indigenous movements with resources absent to Peru’s indigenous movement.    
Although some indigenous peoples managed to mobilize without any 
international support from transnational actors, NGOs provided indigenous 
organizations with an additional impetus to continue protesting for their demands; 
and with funding that made indigenous mobilization easier to sustain (Andolina et 
al, p. 682).  Transnational actors also enabled indigenous peoples in Ecuador and 
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Bolivia to network and to form relationships with one another at the transnational 
level, which strengthened their movements overall. 
Indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador also enjoyed some state 
support for their initiatives, which was absent for Peru’s indigenous movement.  
Through the recognition of indigenous organizations, passage of laws, 
incorporation of indigenous institutions into the government, and constitutional 
reform, the Bolivian and Ecuadorian state legitimized the demands and existence 
of mobilized indigenous groups.  For instance, the Bolivian state’s ratification of 
the International Labor Organization (ILO)’s Convention 169 in 1991 and of the 
Law of Popular Participation in 1995 bolstered Bolivia’s indigenous movement 
for the state formally recognized indígenas by their traditions and territorial 
claims rather than by their economic status as campesinos (Andolina et al, p. 688).  
Similarly, constitutional reform passed by the Ecuadorian and Bolivian states 
played a pivotal role in the success of their indigenous movements.  Since the 
Bolivian and Ecuadorian states recognized their societies as plurinational and 
multicultural in their constitutions, they simultaneously legitimized the traditions 
of its indigenous peoples as well as recognized a primary demand of their 
indigenous movements.  Finally, the incorporation of indigenous organizations 
into the Ecuadorian and Bolivian states initially bolstered their indigenous 
movements at the national level since indigenous groups had an outlet to make 
their demands directly heard by the government. 
Leadership at the national and local levels also impacted the success of 
indigenous movements in both Ecuador and Bolivia.  In Bolivia, leadership is 
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paramount in ayllus.
16
  Since they promote indigenous identities through their 
leadership, ayllu leaders play a pivotal role in promoting dialogue and indigenous 
identity as indigenous representatives at the international and national levels 
(Andolina et al, p. 696).  Leadership in Ecuador is more symbolic.  For example, 
Luis Macas, a prominent head of CONAIE, is a significant leader for Ecuador’s 
indigenous movement as a facilitator of indigenous demands.  Since Ecuador and 
Bolivia both had inspiring indigenous leaders, their movements were more 
sustainable. 
Bicultural education initiatives also strengthened indigenous movements 
in both Ecuador and Bolivia.  Ultimately, bicultural education initiatives have 
strengthened communal political institutions as well as become a source for 
national, indigenous political movements (Perreault, p. 78).  For these reasons, 
bicultural education has facilitated the evolution of indigenous movements at the 
national level. 
According to Donna Van Cott, ethnic parties were able to form in Bolivia 
and Ecuador as a result of their open institutional environments (Van Cott, p. 8).  
Van Cott notes that due to Ecuador and Bolivia’s transitions to democracy during 
the 1990s, political-associational space opened for existing organizations to act 
and for new organizations to form (Van Cott, p. 10).  Similarly, the decline of the 
Left in Ecuador and Bolivia during the 1990s allowed these ethnic parties to form 
                                                 
16
 Ayllus are “Andean indigenous communities of extended families, cargo-based leadership 
patterns, and occupation of specific territorial spaces.”  In a cargo-based leadership pattern, 
“community leaders are expected to begin in lower offices to gain experience and recognition, and 
proceed gradually stepwise to positions of greater prestige and responsibility” (Andolina et al, p. 
679). 
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(Van Cott, p. 8).  The creation of ethnic, indigenous parties, therefore, sustained 
indigenous movements in both Ecuador and Bolivia. 
Compared to Ecuador and Bolivia, indigenous organization in Peru is a 
perplexing anomaly.  Although a majority of its population (about 40 percent) 
consists of indígenas—an indigenous population higher than Ecuador—its 
indigenous movement has been stagnant (Yashar, p. 19).  Like Ecuador and 
Bolivia, Peru experienced a similar colonial history and indigenous 
stigmatization.  Race relations in Peru, therefore, succumb to the same social 
hierarchy as in Ecuador and Bolivia where wealth and superiority are associated 
with whiteness; and where poverty, simple-mindedness, and inferiority are 
associated with being indigenous or black (Otero, p. 330).  All three societies also 
practiced a hacienda system that comprised of a white patrón and indigenous or 
black campesinos.  Similarly, the hacienda systems in all three societies were 
challenged by the rise of a labor (or peasant) movement, and eradicated by 
agrarian reforms.  Due to these similarities, Peru’s indigenous movement 
theoretically should have transpired from its labor movement like the cases of 
Ecuador and Bolivia. 
In practice, however, Peru’s indigenous movement does not match the 
indigenous movements of both Bolivia and Ecuador.  At first glance, Peru’s 
geography and ethnic localities appear to be the cause of Peru’s lack of an 
indigenous movement.  Since high concentrations of indigenous populations in all 
three countries are located along the Andes Mountains, however, Peru’s 
geography logically is not a contributing factor. 
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Gerardo Otero asserts that multicultural integration may have thwarted 
indigenous mobilization in Peru.  According to Otero, multicultural integration is 
a challenge for emerging Latin American democracies due to the ruling class 
ideology that their nations are culturally homogenous (Otero et al, p. 518).  The 
ideology of the ruling class, however, was overcome in Ecuador and Bolivia by 
their indigenous movements’ persistent demands for constitutional reforms, which 
shows that the view of the elite is permeable (Otero et al, p. 518).  Therefore, the 
challenge of multicultural integration may be problematic in the Peruvian case, 
but it does not explain why its indigenous movement was weaker than indigenous 
movements in Bolivia and Ecuador. 
A main contributor to the Peruvian indigenous case is fear of violence 
from Sendero Luminoso and components of the state itself.  Sendero Luminoso 
was a leftist organization that arose during the 1970s under the leadership of 
Abimael Guzmán, who emulated Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution.  
Headquartered in the Peruvian countryside, Sendero Luminoso often terrorized 
rural communities to join its organization. 
Sendero Luminoso, however, was not the only promulgator of rural 
violence.  Violence was precipitated by the state as well.  To control Sendero 
Luminoso and to attempt to capture its leader Gúzman, the García administration 
declared parts of the Peruvian countryside as “emergency zones,” which granted 
the military sole control of the area.  The only problem, however, was that 
Sendero Luminoso had covertly infiltrated the Peruvian countryside by absorbing 
followers from all age groups, classes, and sexes.  As a result, the military could 
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not determine systematically who was a follower of Sendero Luminoso until a 
guerilla attack was launched; or without interrogating its captives.  For these 
reasons, the Peruvian military often terrorized the countryside, particularly 
targeting indigenous communities, to discover Sendero Luminoso’s supporters 
(State of Fear, 2005). 
President Alberto Fujimori also inhibited indigenous mobilization in Peru.  
He attained tremendous executive power that transformed Peru from a democratic 
society to an authoritarian regime (García Calderón, p. 48).  For example, in April 
1992, Fujimori staged an autogolpe, or the executive overthrow of the legislative 
and judicial branches of government, in order to halt Gúzman’s plot to attack 
Lima and to take over the state (García Calderón, p. 48).  Although Gúzman was 
captured in September 1992, Fujimori still maintained his executive control over 
the Peruvian state (García Calderón, p. 48).  Without an outlet to justify the 
necessity of his authoritarian rule, however, Fujimori needed new targets—the 
Peruvian people (State of Fear, 2005).  He also dismantled any institution, such as 
the media, that acted against the message of the Fujimori administration (García 
Calderón, p. 50).  Naturally, other organizations that called for the reform of the 
state (which was a major demand of indigenous movements in both Ecuador and 
Bolivia) were dissolved. 
Due to constant fear promulgated by Sendero Luminoso and then by the 
Fujimori administration, indigenous mobilization remained regional rather than 
growing into a national movement for it lacked factors that contributed to the 
indigenous movements of Bolivia and Ecuador (Yashar, p. 58-59).  For example, 
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due to fear of violence and retaliation, most NGOs avoided sustained involvement 
in the Peruvian countryside to help facilitate an indigenous movement.  
Indigenous peoples, as a result, were unable to utilize the resources provided by 
transnational actors (such as transnational networking and bicultural education).  
Similarly, Deborah Yashar asserts that indigenous movements emerged due to a 
combination of three factors—changing citizenship regimes, transcommunity 
networks, and open political-associational space (Yashar, p. 29).  According to 
Yashar, Peru lacked these factors due to the civil war between Sendero Luminoso 
and the Peruvian state as well as foreclosed political-associational space (Yashar, 
p. 26). 
A third factor that contributed to the case of Peru was indigenous 
classification by indígenas themselves (McClintock, p. 3).  According to Cynthia 
McClintock, the “political dynamics [of Peru] since 1968 as well as its geography 
and demographic trends…limit[ed] the establishment of indigenous identities [as 
evident] in recent decades” (McClintock, p. 2).  She claims that indigenous 
groups in Peru identified on a class, rather than ethnic, basis since the military 
dictator, Juan Velasco Alvarado, reclassified indigenous communities as peasant 
communities when he came to power in 1968 (McClintock, p. 4).  The emphasis 
of class was also reinforced by the ideology of Sendero Luminoso throughout the 
1980s (McClintock, p. 4).  Without an emphasis on ethnicity, indigenous 
mobilization suffered in Peru. 
With the capture of Fujimori and the reinstallation of a separation of 
powers system, Peru’s current political and social environment is different for its 
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indigenous peoples today.  Since the founding of its Truth Commission, Peru has 
been recognizing the atrocities that occurred under the Fujimori administration 
(McClintock, p. 4).  President Alejandro Toledo, the successor of Alberto 
Fujimori, also facilitated the country’s transition back to democracy (State of 
Fear, 2005).  Currently, Peruvian indigenous peoples have more opportunities to 
mobilize than 30 years ago when the Ecuadorian and Bolivian indigenous 
movements were launching and evolving at the national level. 
Developments at the grassroots level also suggest that Peruvian indígenas 
may be mobilizing more successfully now than in the past.  According to María 
Elena García, bicultural education in the highlands is being pushed by 
intercultural activists as well as by the Peruvian Ministry of Education in Lima 
(Elena García, p. 71).  Due to bicultural education, an indigenous elite is 
emerging in the countryside, mostly comprised of youth (Elena García, p. 85).  
Not surprisingly, the progression of indigenous youth in Peru mirrors the 
beginnings of indigenous movements in both Ecuador and Bolivia.  Therefore, 
Peruvian indigenous peoples have the potential to mobilize at the national level if 
they so choose. 
In addition, indigenous peoples politically have become more self-
determined at the local level.  For example, Carlos Ivan Degregori notes that the 
number of mayors who can speak Quechua has increased in the Peruvian 
highlands since the mid-2000s (McClintock, p. 14).  Elena García also 
emphasizes that indigenous community leaders have been pushing for schools 
controlled by the indigenous community (Elena García, p. 82). 
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Of course, there are some complications for indigenous mobilization in 
Peru.  First, Peru is currently considered a democracy in transition (State of Fear, 
2005).  Ideally, the push of the Peruvian government to institute reform would 
seem conducive for indigenous mobilization.  In practice, however, Peru’s 
transition most likely means its government will be focused on internal reforms 
rather than on the concerns of its indigenous peoples. 
A second complication is the classification of Peru’s presidential 
candidates since the early-2000s.  Technically, Alejandro Toledo is considered 
Peru’s first indigenous president for he was “born into poverty in a rural mountain 
community of northern Peru” and “his physical features are…conventionally 
considered indigenous” by Peruvian standards (McClintock, p. 8).  His 
identification as the first indigenous president may be problematic for the 
indigenous movement since his election was not based on a platform to honor 
indigenous demands. 
Finally, a third complication that may impede indigenous mobilization is 
political indifference.  According to Ernesto García Calderón, most Peruvians 
“[do not] care…whether they live in a democracy…as long as their lifestyles were 
not threatened” (García Calderón, p. 53).  Although Peruvian citizens protested 
Fujimori’s attempt to disregard the constitution and to run for a third presidential 
term, political indifference may still persist among indigenous peoples in the 
Peruvian countryside if their current lifestyles are not affected by Peru’s 
democratic transition. 
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Due to the upheaval caused by Sendero Luminoso and the Fujimori 
administration that disrupted indigenous lifestyles, however, indigenous peoples 
may be more apt to take action under a political system that is currently valuing 
democratic forms of government (García Calderón, p. 53).  Despite Peru’s violent 
past, indígenas have more political-associational space to speak freely of their 
atrocities via the Truth Commission.  Subsequently, the actions of the Truth 
Commission may inspire indigenous peoples to speak freely of ways to prevent 
future atrocities against their communities from happening.  How can indigenous 
peoples prevent Peru’s violent past from repeating?  Obviously, one method, as 
used by indigenous peoples in Ecuador and Bolivia, may be indigenous 
mobilization, organization, and demand for equal rights at the national level. 
